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Extreme rainfall events have increased in parts of the United States and climate models 
project that trend to continue (Carter et al. 2018; Mullens et al. 2013; Hayhoe et al. 2018). As 
such, forecasters must be able to effectively communicate the potential threats and impacts 
associated with these events to their users. How National Weather Service (NWS) meteorologists 
and hydrologists communicate with their audiences leading up to and during extreme rainfall 
events has not yet been widely explored. This study aims to help address that knowledge gap.  
This research investigated how NWS forecasters processed and communicated 
information about extreme rainfall events that occurred in the South Central U.S. between 2015 
and 2019. An event was included in this study if the NWS Hydrometeorological Design Studies 
Center determined it to have an Annual Exceedance Probability of 1/500 or less in one of their 
storm analyses. Nine events were identified. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 
NWS forecasters about their experiences with the events and how they or their offices messaged 
the event(s). Study participants were asked event-specific questions about products disseminated 
by their offices leading up to and during the event(s) and how they internally processed and 
externally communicated model outliers and anomalous rainfall events overall. Interviews also 
explored forecasters’ perceptions of the relationship between these events and climate change 
and if those perceptions impacted the forecasts and messaging for the event.  
Using deductive qualitative analysis, components of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005; 
Butterworth 2010; and Doswell 2004) and decision-making (Millet et al. 2020) conceptual 
frameworks as well as principles of forecasting (Armstrong 2001b) were identified in the 
responses. A simple forecast communication process model was created to illustrate the findings. 
While the forecast and communication processes are complex and vary between offices and 
forecasters, these frameworks and the process model provide a high-level understanding of how 
forecasters translate their knowledge to usable information for their audiences. With an 
awareness of the purpose of the forecast, forecasters use sensemaking and decision-making 
frameworks to process data from models and observations. These processes are impacted by 
forecast uncertainty, which will always be present but is challenging to convey. Then, forecasters 
consider what sensemaking and decision-making processes their audiences will go through as 
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they try to understand the forecast information. These principles and frameworks then impact 
how they present the forecast to their audiences. The study also found that forecasters do not 
consider the impacts climate change might have on an extreme rainfall event when forecasting 
such an event. However, climate change is something that they may consider when reflecting on 
the event after it occurred.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Flooding is one of the most hazardous and costly weather phenomena in the United States 
(U.S.). Since 2015, the south central region of the U.S. has experienced eight one-billion-dollar 
disasters associated with extreme rainfall (NOAA NCEI 2021). Behind heat, flooding is the 
second deadliest weather hazard in the U.S. (NWS 2020). Also, since 2015, 259 people have lost 
their lives to flooding in the Southern Climate Impacts Planning Program (SCIPP) region (NWS 
La Crosse 2021). The National Weather Service (NWS) attempts to mitigate the impacts of these 
events through its mission of protecting life and property by providing data, forecasts, and 
warnings (NWS 2021). Thanks to numerical weather prediction (NWP) and improving 
technology, weather forecasts continue to improve (Bauer et al. 2015).  
While improvements to the quality of weather forecasts are crucial, it is also important to 
be able to effectively communicate these forecasts to users (Losee et al. 2017). Effective 
communication will continue to grow in importance as extreme events such as extreme rainfall 
events are projected to increase in frequency and intensity (Easterling et al. 2017). The number 
of studies on how end-users interpret forecast information is growing (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 
2005; Joslyn and Savelli 2010; Morss and Hayden 2010). However, how forecasters process and 
then communicate weather events has not been well studied (Morss et al. 2015). This study aims 
to add to the knowledge base of how NWS forecasters translate their meteorological knowledge 
into information that is usable to their audiences. Specifically, this study examines: 
• How forecasters internally process model outliers leading up to and during extreme 
rainfall events;  
• How forecasters communicate to external audiences leading up to and during events; and  
• Forecaster perception of climate change and its relationship to extreme rainfall events.  
Sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005; Doswell 2004), decision-making (Millet et al. 2020), 
and principles of forecasting (Armstrong 2001b) are used to create a high-level understanding of 
the forecast and communication processes of extreme rainfall events in the SCIPP region. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of literature on the climatology of extreme rainfall events, 
forecasting communication and uncertainty, and social science theories that can be applied to the 
forecast and communication process. Chapter 3 describes the study methodology. Chapter 4 
provides the results and presents a simple forecasting process model to visualize the results, 
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while Chapter 5 is a discussion of the results. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis as well as provides 
recommendations for future works.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Research on how end users interpret and use forecast information has continued to 
increase (e.g., Gigregenzer et al. 2005; Joslyn and Savelli 2010; Burgeno and Joslyn 2020; Morss 
and Hayden 2010; and Perreault et al. 2014). However, less is known about how forecasters use 
their knowledge of complex atmospheric data and the decisions they make as they translate that 
information into graphics and text that are useful and usable to end-users (Morss et al. 2015). A 
knowledge gap exists between the production of scientific knowledge and its decision-making 
usability (Morss et al. 2011). This knowledge gap can be bridged. Sherman-Morris et al. (2018) 
found that management across Weather Forecasting Offices (WFOs) have a favorable view of 
social science. They feel that research should be conducted on what actions are taken in response 
to warnings and why, the most usable information for decision-makers, how well warnings are 
understood, and how best to communicate uncertainty. This project aims to add to that 
knowledge base. This chapter will explore the background of the project by reviewing the 
region’s extreme rainfall climatology, forecasting processes and communication, and social 
science theories that can be applied to forecasting. 
2.1 Climatology of extreme rainfall events in the SCIPP region 
Extreme rainfall events are projected to increase in frequency and intensity with climate 
change (Mullens et al. 2013; Hayhoe et al. 2018; Trenberth et al. 2003). Over the past 25 years, 
the number of days with three or more inches of rain have been significantly above normal in the 
Southeast United States (Carter et al. 2018). Groisman et al. (2012) found that in the south 
central United States, there are about 0.53-0.64 days per year that experience three or more 
inches of rain. In the Southern Great Plains, rainfall events are projected to decrease in 
frequency, but increase in intensity, creating periods of extreme drought followed by flood 
(Kloesel et al. 2018). However, rainfall events at or above the 95th percentile are increasing in 
frequency in the SCIPP region (Mallakpour and Villarini 2017). In portions of the Southeast 
United States, hourly rainfall rates are increasing but hours with precipitation are decreasing, 
signaling that more rain is falling in shorter amounts of time, which can worsen associated 
impacts (Brown et al. 2019a). For example, in Louisiana 90th percentile rainfall events contribute 
to half of the annual rainfall in .005% of total annual hours (Brown et al. 2019b). 
 While it is important to emphasize the link between extreme events and climate change 
so that the public acknowledges the urgency of the issue (Durran 2020; Felischhut et al. 2020), it 
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is difficult to attribute individual events to climate change due to small-scale processes that are 
unable to be accounted for in climate models (Durran 2020; Easterling et al. 2017). Hoffman et 
al. (2017) claim that for this reason, as well as political and social reasons, NWS forecasters are 
more likely to focus on the data in front of them when facing an extreme event rather than 
consider if climate change is playing a role.  
2.2 Forecasting 
Meteorologists have a plethora of information available to them when making forecasts, 
and they cannot analyze all of it within their time constraints so they must choose what they feel 
is the most reliable (Daipha 2015; Doswell 2004). One such source of information accessible to 
forecasters is weather models, including relatively new ensemble guidance, which add value to 
extreme precipitation forecasts, especially as the models continue to improve (Schumacher 
2017). However, each forecaster interprets ensemble model output differently (Evans et al. 2013) 
and sometimes struggles interpreting probabilistic guidance from ensembles (Wilson et al. 2018). 
Ensemble flood forecasting presents these issues as well (Demeritt et al. 2010). Struggling with 
ensemble interpretation likely means that how forecasters perceive and utilize model outliers is 
not uniform across forecasters. WFOs must work within themselves (Daipha 2015) as well as 
with neighboring offices, national centers, and partners to ensure that a consistent message is 
being broadcast agency-wide to avoid any confusion or loss of trust (Childs and Schumacher 
2018; Sherman-Morris et al. 2018).  
2.2.1 Forecast communication 
While models have greatly improved, and consistent model output greatly increases a 
forecaster’s confidence that an event will occur, forecasters have expressed that models struggle 
to predict event timing well, making it difficult to convey forecast information to their audiences 
effectively (Childs and Schumacher 2018). Effective communication of a forecast is an 
increasingly important part of NWS operations. Expanding beyond core partners and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radios as messaging dispersion 
tools, the NWS has taken advantage of the evolution of social media to directly reach the public 
as well as allow the public and other end-users to communicate back (Hubbard 2018). While 
social media has helped the NWS reach more of their public audience, there is still the issue of 
the best way to use this communication platform. Research on the subject is still in its infancy 
but an early investigation showed that posts with more detailed information and strongly worded 
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language received the most attention from the public, meaning they are more likely to act 
accordingly (Ripberger et al. 2014). However, using strongly worded language must be carefully 
considered. While strong language can be effective to some people, others may think that it is 
overly dramatic and may cause them to lose trust in the NWS (Morss and Hayden 2010; 
Perreault et al. 2014). Information should also be included that can help the end user take proper 
protective action rather than just informing them that a threat is coming (Eachus and Keim 
2019). NWS offices tend to do well in following organizational guidelines and general best 
practices when it comes to hazard communication but sometimes struggle with including 
actionable information while the threat is ongoing, conveying what is happening at that moment 
but not how to deal with it (Olson et al. 2019). 
It is also important that the public can understand the forecast products that are published. 
Using language that is too technical or subjective can make the product difficult to correctly 
interpret (Sivle and Aamodt 2019). Also, if the product is not presented in an appealing way, it 
will not be used (Kuonen et al. 2019). Carr et al. (2016) found that their participants felt that 
many NWS flood products were difficult to understand or visually unappealing. Even after 
making suggested edits to one product, the public still found it difficult to understand. 
Sophisticated users felt that changes helped, suggesting that some products cannot serve all 
audiences (Carr et al. 2018). Bostrom et al. (2016) found that several NWS products are not used 
at all by their partners. The need for better coordination between the NWS and their partners 
exists so that efforts to create new and/or maintain unused products are not wasted.  
Another communication challenge that forecasters face is being able to address a targeted 
audience according to their needs. When addressing the public, it is difficult to do so with one 
uniform message, as it is full of diverse communities (Rouleau 2016). It is important that 
audiences can understand the forecasts and process them in a way that is relevant to their own 
needs. Knowing that a hazard exists does not necessarily mean that one believes it will apply to 
them (Sanders et al. 2020). Many members of the public are solely interested in how an event is 
going to affect them personally, indicating a desire for localized forecasts that are not currently 
feasible (Carr et al. 2016; Childs and Schumacher 2018). What is relevant to a person is dynamic 
as well, as they could be more vulnerable to weather hazards as their activities and locations 
change throughout the day. Their vulnerability could change as they go from home to work to 
the store, etc. (Sivle and Aamodt 2019). However, Daipha (2015) saw that some forecasters did 
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not have an interest in learning more about their public to better communicate with them. When 
WFOs work with end users to better understand these needs and how forecasts are interpreted, 
there is more trust in both the forecast itself as well as trust that the forecast will be used properly 
(Kuonen et al. 2019). WFOs feel they work well with partners, especially emergency managers 
(EMs), to understand their needs (Sherman-Morris et al. 2018). These interactions are crucial, 
not only educating forecasters on the real-world value of their forecasts and motivating them to 
learn more about partner needs (Hoffman et al. 2017), but also improving forecast 
communication systems. To be successful, these interactions should be consistently maintained 
(Demuth et al. 2012; Liu and Seate 2021), as it is insufficient to only interact when an event is 
imminent (Senkbeil et al. 2020). To create the best forecast products, it is important for 
communicators to test the products and tailor them based on audience feedback (Rouleau 2016; 
Childs and Schumacher 2018; Demuth et al. 2012). Studies have attempted this with end users 
(Carr et al. 2016, 2018), but less is known about how NWS forecasters treat or react to audience 
feedback on specific products. 
2.2.2 Forecast uncertainty 
Uncertainty is inherent in weather forecasts, especially with extreme rainfall, as 
quantitative precipitation forecasts (QPFs) are reliant on processes that are difficult to model, 
especially in the longer term (Schumacher 2017). As in Morss et al. (2008) and NRC (2006), in 
this study uncertainty refers to a forecast that expresses “imperfect knowledge about future 
weather” (Morss et al. 2008, pp. 975). Forecasters will try and minimize uncertainty in a forecast 
by monitoring model agreement for as long as they can while still allowing sufficient lead time 
(Bostrom et al. 2016) but it is not possible to eliminate uncertainty. It is important to include 
uncertainty in forecast products as it increases the “goodness” of the forecast, specifically 
boosting the consistency trait of forecast goodness (Murphy 1993). 
However, there are challenges associated with conveying uncertainty information. One 
way that forecasters convey uncertainty is by qualitatively describing their confidence or lack 
thereof in a forecast. When doing so, forecasters must be careful if they choose the word 
“uncertainty” as that could cause the audience to lose confidence in the forecast (Rouleau 2016). 
However, studies have found that audiences are aware of the inherent uncertainty in forecasts 
(Morss et al. 2008; Joslyn and Savelli 2010). Another method currently used to express 
uncertainty information is return intervals. However, these pose issues: when people are told 
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they are facing a 100-year flood event, they believe the event can only happen once every 100 
years. Grounds et al. (2018) found that using probabilities led to better decisions than return 
intervals did. Forecasters often feel that the public struggles to interpret probability information 
and are better off being given deterministic forecasts (Daipha 2015; Stewart et al. 2015; Demeritt 
et al. 2010). Some studies agree, finding that members of the general public do not understand 
probability information, as well as other forecast information, in the way that it is officially 
defined (Gigerenzer et al. 2005; Fleischhut et al. 2020; Morss et al. 2008). Even forecasters 
themselves have differing interpretations of uncertainty information, such as the Probability of 
Precipitation (PoP) (Stewart et al. 2015; Daipha 2015; Demeritt et al. 2010).  
However, it has been found that end users make better, more informed decisions when 
uncertainty information is included in the forecast (LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Fundel et al. 2019; 
Roulston and Kaplan 2009; McCarthy et al. 2007). Uncertainty information could not only lead 
to better decision making, but it could also improve forecast evaluation, as rare events are 
especially difficult to score, which was addressed by Stephenson et al. (2008). They suggested 
using probabilistic forecasts and establishing a scoring method to be better able to assess extreme 
event forecast performance. While the NWS is making efforts to incorporate probabilistic 
information into forecasts (Just and Foley 2020), most products currently issued by the NWS are 
deterministic (Novak et al. 2008; Hirschberg et al. 2011; Wilson et al. 2018). Studies have found 
that some forecasters want to include more uncertainty information in their forecasts (Murphy 
and Winkler 1974) but need additional training to be better able to express that uncertainty 
(Novak et al. 2008). Wilson et al. (2018) also support the need for more forecaster training on 
probabilistic guidance and uncertainty information as the weather enterprise expands its use of 
such products.  
As with other types of forecast information, the needs of the audience are important when 
considering what kind of uncertainty information to convey (Fundel et al. 2019; Carr et al. 2018). 
For example, the needs of EM officials are not only different from that of the public, but also 
vary amongst themselves (Kox et al. 2014). By working with their partners, WFOs can establish 
the kind of uncertainty information that works best for each group. Overall, more research on the 
subject of communicating uncertainty is needed (Morss et al. 2008). This project aims to add to 
that knowledge base. Forecaster responses to questions about forecast uncertainty are discussed 
in chapter four. 
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2.3: Social science theories and frameworks 
Social science theories are utilized in this study to help understand forecast and 
communication processes. This section will review these theories and how they have been 
applied to risk communication. Conceptual and mental models are often used to visualize how 
information is processed and communicated. Meteorologists have used conceptual models to 
visualize their knowledge for decades (Hoffman et al. 2017). Mental models explore how 
individual experience shapes reasoning and that though these processes are individual, people in 
similar situations could develop similar models (Millet et al. 2020). Bostrom et al. (2016) and 
Morss et al. (2015) both used mental models to obtain an understanding of how forecasters and 
stakeholders process hurricane and flash flood risks, respectively. Such models frame that 
process as simplified and one-way. However, it is important to acknowledge that mental models 
are actually complex and systems (Morss et al. 2017). Lejano et al. (2016) established a model 
that focuses on how organizational processes impact the risk communication process (Fig. 2.1). 
This textual processing model of risk communication can be used to analyze how information is 
transferred from a source to and between organizations and finally to the receiver. This model 
can also be used to analyze how information is translated within an organization and then passed 
on to either the next organization or the end user. One step past the Lejano et al. (2016) model, 
Hoffman et al. (2017) presented The Base Model of expertise (Fig. 2.2). This model details the 
intra-organizational processes that result in a certain action, in the case of forecasting, the 
creation of forecast products. Along with process and mental models, conceptual frameworks can 
Figure 2.1: Textual processing model of risk communication from Lejano et al. (2016) 
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be applied to understand how forecasters internally process and externally communicate extreme 
rainfall events. Such frameworks include sensemaking, principles of forecasting, and judgement 
and decision-making.   
2.3.1: Sensemaking 
Sensemaking is described as the critical processes that people use to understand 
unfamiliar situations so that they can take the appropriate actions in those circumstances (Weick 
et al. 2005; Stigliani and Ravasi 2012; Tisch and Galbreath 2018). While many studies focus on 
individual sensemaking, these processes can also happen on a community level. When social 
groups communicate their understanding and decision making, it is called community 
sensegiving. While this does occur between decision makers and forecasters, there is more trust 
among peers (Tisch and Galbreath 2018). Different sensemaking processes at different levels can 
create a disconnect because sensemaking is not always rational and may not result in the same 
interpretation even in identical situations (Helms Mills and Weatherbee 2006). In fact, Helms 
Mills and Weatherbee (2006) used sensemaking to explain seemingly poor decisions made 
during Hurricane Juan by residents of Nova Scotia. Butterworth (2010) applied Weick et al.’s 
(2005) eight properties of sensemaking to broadcast meteorology. This work will build upon that 
Figure 2.2: The Base Model of expertise reproduced by permission by R.R. Hoffman, all rights reserved 2021. 
First published in Hoffman (2017). 
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to apply them further across the weather enterprise, namely NWS forecasters. These properties 
are organizing flux, noticing and bracketing, labeling, retrospect, presumption, social and 
systemic, action, and organizing through communication. Doswell (2004) also introduced 
representativeness as a sensemaking process.  
Organizing flux: Organizing flux is the process of finding organization amid chaos and the 
overwhelming influx of information (Butterworth 2010). When forecasting extreme weather, 
NWS forecasters must be able to do this, as there is no possible way for them to analyze every 
piece of information they receive in the forecasting process (Daipha 2015; Graham et al. 2013; 
Hoffman et al. 2017).  
Noticing and bracketing: Noticing and bracketing occurs when one identifies a departure from 
normal (Weick et al. 2005). NWS forecasters may note certain weather features that have led to 
large rainfall amounts in the past or a change in climatological patterns.  
Labeling: Labeling “describes an event in a particular way” to link the current event to a 
familiar concept (Butterworth 2010). For example, a forecaster labeling an event as 
“catastrophic” may pique the attention of their partners and the public.  
Retrospect: Forecasters may use past experience to make sense of the ambiguous environment, 
which can be referred to as retrospect (Butterworth 2010). For example, a forecaster may be less 
likely to ignore a model outlier if such an outlier had verified in a past event.  
Presumption: Presumption is described by Weick et al. (2005, p. 12) as “to connect the abstract 
with the concrete”. In meteorology, this is done when one can forecast how a storm will evolve 
and its potential impacts (Butterworth 2010). For example, forecasters may recognize that the 
“ingredients” for an extreme rainfall event are present, giving them more confidence in their 
forecast.  
Social and systemic: Sensemaking can be impacted by social factors, such as organizational 
constraints (Weick et al. 2005). In the NWS, some forecasters may be hesitant to forecast 
extreme values due to the general guidelines established by the organization.  
Action: The purpose of sensemaking is deciding what action, if any, should be taken 
(Butterworth 2010). In forecasting, this can be applied to when forecasters assess model output 
and whether or not they should adjust the forecast or leave it as is.  
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Organizing through communication: Sensemaking also occurs through communication with 
others (Butterworth 2010). This is a form of collective sensemaking in which discussions take 
place in order to come to a mutual understanding and agreement on a course of action (Stigliani 
and Ravasi 2012). NWS forecasters not only communicate within their office, but with other 
offices and their partners in media and emergency management to ensure that both the 
forecasters and users have a common understanding of an event.  
Representativeness: Representativeness is better known in the forecasting world as “pattern 
recognition” where forecasters will make sense of an environment by classifying it among past 
similar situations (Doswell 2004). 
2.3.2: Principles of forecasting 
The book Principles of Forecasting (Armstrong 2001a) compiled a series of papers that 
discussed principles of forecasting that can be applied across various fields of study, such as 
economics, finance, psychology, and meteorology. The chapter “Standards & Practices for 
Forecasting” (Armstrong 2001b) summarized those papers, discussing 139 principles and sorting 
them into 16 categories. The description, purpose, conditions when the principle would not 
apply, and the strength and source of evidence for that principle are provided for each of the 139 
principles. Armstrong (2001b) acknowledges that all 139 principles will never be used at once, 
but that the ones that are used are dependent on the situation. The principles that can be applied 
to this study have been sorted into three sections: forecast purpose, forecast presentation, and 
forecast uncertainty.  
Forecast purpose: To produce a usable forecast, the forecaster needs to understand what 
decisions might be made based on the forecast, and what information is needed to make those 
decisions so that the forecast can be tailored to those needs (Armstrong 2001b). For example, 
NWS forecasters may present forecasts differently to different audiences depending on the needs 
of those audiences.  
Forecast presentation: For forecasts to be useful, they must be presented in a simple, 
understandable, and meaningful way, such as presenting possible scenarios (Armstrong 2001b). 
For example, NWS forecasters often present more complex information to their expert partners 
than they are to the public.  
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Forecast uncertainty: Forecasts are inherently uncertain (Hoffman et al. 2017). When 
presenting the forecast, meteorologists must be careful not to imply false precision by including 
insignificant digits, be conservative when making changes to the forecast if uncertainty is high, 
and acknowledge why the forecast could be wrong (Armstrong 2001b). In weather forecasting, 
NWS meteorologists are better able to forecast a high-impact event when the uncertainty is low.  
2.3.3: Judgement and decision-making 
Decisions cannot always be rational (Daipha 2015). Studies on Judgement and Decision-
Making (JDM) identify heuristics and biases that influence the choices people make when facing 
uncertainty (Millet et al. 2020). Heuristics are described as “mental shortcuts” that people take 
when making decisions (Millet et al. 2020; Milch et al. 2018) that could lead to biases that 
impact decision-making (Millet et al. 2020). Doswell (2004) was one of the first studies to apply 
heuristics to weather forecasting and emphasized the need for further work on the subject. Millet 
et al. (2020) suggested using JDM principles to adjust how forecast information is presented, 
which would in turn improve user decision making. The paper provides an extensive table of the 
various heuristics and biases they identified in their literature review. These frameworks are 
affect, anchoring and adjustment, availability bias, confirmation bias, finite pool of worry, 
gambler’s fallacy, loss aversion, and temporal/spatial myopia. 
Affect: Affect is the impact of emotions on decision-making based on past experiences (Millet at 
al. 2020). After an area has experienced an extreme event, residents may be more attentive to the 
potential for another event and make decisions based on their emotions rather than logic. 
Anchoring and adjustment: Anchoring and adjustment happens when someone attaches 
themselves to an initial value and will incrementally adjust from that value as new information 
comes in, even if that original value may not have been reliable (Millet et al. 2020; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). This is similar to the forecasting process within the NWS. Forecasters will 
publish an initial forecast value and have the option to adjust that value as they process more 
information.  
Availability bias: This bias occurs when one cannot think of or recall a similar event, so decides 
that the likelihood of the incoming event is low (Millet et al. 2020; Milch et al. 2018; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974). To adjust for this bias in their end users, meteorologists must produce 
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forecasts that either recall past events or paint an image in their audiences’ minds of the potential 
impacts of the impending event.  
Confirmation bias: Confirmation bias is when one will gravitate towards information that aligns 
with their existing conceptions or that poses the best possible outcome for them (Millet et al. 
2020). Forecasters may have to convince an emergency manager that a hurricane is capable of 
producing impacts that the emergency manager has never seen before to work against their 
confirmation bias.  
Finite pool of worry: When people are faced with many threats, they may not be able to process 
each one, and instead focus on just one or a few and ignore the others. This heuristic is called 
finite pool of worry (Millet et al. 2020). For example, during hurricanes, people might be so 
worried about the winds from the storm that they do not consider flooding so forecasters must be 
able to message which threat is most dangerous to those people.  
Gambler’s fallacy: Gambler’s fallacy occurs when people feel that because they recently 
experienced a rare or extreme event, they cannot experience another in the near future because of 
the rarity of the event (Millet et al. 2020). For example, audiences struggle with return intervals, 
as they do not understand that a 100-year event does not mean it only happens every 100 years 
(Grounds et al. 2018). 
Loss aversion: When being informed about an event, people are more likely to pay attention to 
what they could lose depending on the actions they do or do not take rather than what they could 
gain (Millet et al. 2020). Forecasters may be better off telling their audience what they could lose 
if they cross that flooded roadway rather than what they could gain by finding a better route. 
Temporal/Spatial Myopia: When an event is far away either spatially or temporally, it is not 
uncommon for the threat associated with that event to be underestimated (Millet et al. 2020). For 
example, a forecaster may not be willing to publish a product for that event outside of a certain 
time frame, even with strong evidence that the event will occur as forecast.  
Chapter Takeaways:  
- While there is research on how end users process forecast information, less is known 
about how forecasters turn forecast information into products. 
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- Extreme rainfall events are projected to increase in frequency and intensity in the South 
Central U.S. 
- Forecasters have a lot of information available to them, and how each forecaster 
interprets this information is different, creating a need for inter- and intra- office 
communication to ensure message consistency. 
- Forecasters must be able to efficiently communicate forecast information to their partners 
and increasingly, the public. 
- Uncertainty is inherent in forecasts and forecasters must find a way to communicate it. 
- Social science theories including conceptual models, sensemaking, decision-making, and 
principles of forecasting can be applied to forecast and communication processes.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
 National Weather Service forecasters throughout the South Central United States 
participated in semi-structured phone interviews. During the interviews, the forecasters were 
asked to discuss their experiences with forecasting and communicating extreme rainfall events. 
Open-ended interview questions allowed the forecasters to highlight what they felt was most 
important (Herbst 1993) regarding the communication of extreme rainfall events while also 
allowing the researcher to guide the conversation to cover the topics of interest. Of the 24 
relevant offices in the region (WFOs, River Forecast Centers (RFCs), and National Centers), 
seven offices were represented in this study (29%) and approximately 6% (21 of about 350) of 
forecasters in the region were interviewed. While these forecasters represented various roles, the 
sample size is small enough that results are not generalizable across the region. Instead, this 
study opens the door to a better understanding of the forecast and communication processes in 
NWS offices during extreme rainfall events.  
3.1 Participant and event selection 
 This research focused on extreme rainfall events in the area of responsibility of SCIPP, 
which consists of Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. For this project, extreme rainfall 
events in the SCIPP region were defined as events that were analyzed by the NWS’s 
Hydrometeorological Designs Studies Center (HDSC) and had an Annual Exceedance 
Probability (AEP) of less than 1/500 (HDSC 2021). These analyses compared precipitation 
frequency estimates from NOAA Atlas 14 to the amount of rain that fell over a given time period 
(HDSC, 2021). NOAA Atlas 14 is a database of precipitation frequency estimates throughout the 
United States over various time periods and recurrence intervals (Perica et al. 2013). By 
comparing event precipitation amounts to the precipitation frequency estimate for the appropriate 
time period and location, event AEPS’s were calculated and mapped (Fig. 3.1). These criteria for 
the analyzed events provided a consistent database of events to analyze. Nine extreme rainfall 
events occurred in the SCIPP region between 2015 and 2021 that fit the criteria (Table 3.1).  
The nine events occurred on time scales ranging from hours to months over various 
spatial scales. The first event identified was the excessive rainfall that occurred over much of 
Oklahoma in the spring of 2015. Next was the Memorial Day 2015 event in central Texas that 
caused devastating flooding in many places, including the Blanco River. Texas again saw 
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extreme rainfall later that year in October. In March 2016 extreme rainfall caused flooding 
across northern Louisiana. In August 2016 southern Louisiana was devastated by flooding due to 
extreme rainfall. There was also the record-smashing rainfall associated with Hurricane Harvey 
in southeast Texas in 2017. Similar to 2015, flooding in Oklahoma and Arkansas occurred during 
spring 2019. Also in 2019, while Hurricane Barry did not produce as much rainfall as it was 
expected to in Louisiana, its remnants did produce large amounts of rain by the time it reached 
Arkansas. Finally, Tropical Storm Imelda was another prolific rainfall producer in southeast 
Texas. 
Prior to the beginning of the study, the methodology, including the interview questions, 
was approved by the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board (IRB, study #11608). 
To protect the identities of the participants in accordance with IRB guidelines, for the remainder 
of the thesis, if a forecaster refers to the event by name in a response, the event name will be 
substituted with [event]. The exact event the forecaster is referring to in the response is not 
relevant to the results of this study.  
Figure 3.1: Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) analysis by the NWS’s Hydrometeorological Designs Study 
Center for Hurricane Harvey. (Source: HDSC 2017) 
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Once the events were identified, a SCIPP researcher1 obtained approval from NWS 
headquarters to conduct this study. Then, the researcher determined the NWS WFO(s) that were 
responsible for forecasting each event. A recruitment email was then sent to the Meteorologist in 
Charge (MIC) of each office asking for participation and to pass the email on to any forecaster 
that might be interested. If there was no response, a follow-up email was sent. In some cases, a 
participant would identify another forecaster that would potentially participate and assist the 
researcher with getting in contact with that person, creating a snowball effect. Because of this 
snowball effect, it is difficult to tell exactly how many forecasters received the recruitment email, 
but the researchers were in direct contact with 28 potential participants. In total, 21NWS 
forecasters from seven WFOs, RFCs, and national centers were interviewed.  
 
















Central TX Convective 6hr <1/500 12.32 
October 24-
25, 30 2015 
TX Convective 3, 6, 24hr <1/500 22.22. 18.03 
March 8-12 
2016 
North LA Atmospheric 
River 
48hr <1/1000 24.58 
August 11-13 
2016 
South LA Tropical moisture 48hr <1/1000 27.60 
August 25-31 
2017 
Southeast TX Tropical system 
(Harvey) 
4 day <1/1000 49.31 
April-May 
2019 
Northern OK Persistent, 
anomalously wet 
period 







24hr <1/1000 16.17 
September 
16-20 2019 
Southeast TX Tropical system 
(Imelda) 
12, 24, 48 hr <1/1000 32.11 
 
1 This work was started in 2018 by another researcher and was briefly paused. It was continued and completed in 
2019 by the author of this thesis. 
Table 3.1: Table of events included in the study. Includes dates, location, a short description of the type of event, 
the time period and AEP from the HDSC analysis (HDSC 2021), and the maximum precipitation at a point in the 
event (Eggleston 2021). 
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The forecasters interviewed held various positions across their offices, with seven 
participants in meteorologist positions and 14 in management roles. All participants had at least 
10 years of experience working in the weather enterprise, including the armed forces, private 
sector, academia, or the media before working with the NWS. The participants had an average of 
about 22 years of experience with the NWS. Three participants were female and eighteen were 
male, which as of 2014, was a ratio representative of NWS meteorologist demographics 
(Sheffield 2015).  
3.2 Interview protocol 
This study addressed the questions: How do forecasters internally process model outliers? 
How do forecasters externally communicate model outliers and outlier events? And do 
forecasters consider climate change when forecasting extreme rainfall events? In order to address 
these issues, the researcher developed an interview protocol of open-ended questions. The 
forecasters were first asked four demographic questions about their forecasting experience. The 
forecasters were then asked about their involvement in forecasting the event(s) in question. 
Thirteen questions were tailored to the event(s) that was (were) relevant to each participant. 
These questions addressed model output, how the event compared to the participant’s experience 
with a prior event(s), confidence leading up to the event(s) and factors that impacted confidence, 
and how they worked with partners. Five questions addressed forecasting and communicating 
extreme rainfall events in general, such as how uncertainty information should be conveyed to 
public audiences, what they want the public to understand about these events, and the importance 
of using social media to convey forecast information. The forecasters were asked if they thought 
that extreme rainfall events were increasing in frequency and/or intensity. If the forecaster 
brought up climate change, they were asked if the background state of climate change had any 
influence on their real-time forecasts. These questions were general and were asked in most 
interviews. 
The remaining questions were tailored to specific events. The author of this thesis 
investigated each of the identified events. Relevant social media graphics and text products were 
identified to get a better meteorological understanding of each event. Based on these products 
and the knowledge of the event, more specific interview questions were developed. These 
questions asked forecasters about the processes of issuing such products. For example, 
forecasters were asked about language choice and how rainfall amounts were expressed. Fig. 3.2 
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is an example of a product used in an interview question. The complete interview protocol can be 
found in Appendix A.  
3.3 Data collection 
 This project began in spring 2018 when seven interviews were conducted between March 
and June by a SCIPP researcher. It was then paused until fall 2019 when more attention could be 
dedicated to the project. The interview protocol was revised and the remaining recruitment and 
interviews were conducted by the author of this thesis between March and August 2020. While 
some interviews were conducted up to four years after the event in question, the events were so 
significant that the forecasters were able to recall the events in vivid detail. By the final 
interviews, answers to several of the questions were no longer unique, meaning that the sample 
was saturated.  
 Once the participant responded to the recruitment email, they were sent further 
information, including a copy of the interview questions and an IRB consent form to be signed 
and returned prior to the interview. Then, a time was set up for the interview. The forecaster was 
told they did not have to look over the questions before the interview, but each one did. The 
participants were informed that their responses would be anonymized.  
While the interviews were intended to be individual phone interviews, one forecaster 
opted to instead type their answers into the previously provided interview guide (beyond the 
Figure 3.2: Product issued on social media by NWS Houston in preparation for Hurricane Harvey. Such products 
were used to guide interview questions (US NWS Houston 2017). 
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control of the researcher) and one office suggested a video conference interview between the 
researcher and three forecasters, allowing the forecasters to feed off of each other’s views of the 
events that transpired. Remote interviews not only allowed forecasters to participate in an 
environment that was familiar and comfortable to them (Taylor et al. 2016) but also allowed this 
project to continue uninterrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The interviews often started 
and/or ended with sidebars on various topics such as the weather or working from home, and 
these would also occasionally occur during the interview. The interviews were recorded using a 
digital audio recorder and lasted about an hour (M= 56 minutes).  
3.4 Data analysis 
 All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the author of this thesis into Microsoft Word. 
Once all interviews were transcribed, the responses were organized by interview question in 
Microsoft Excel to allow for comparison across interviews. Responses were then qualitatively 
analyzed using deductive reasoning, meaning existing social science theories were applied to the 
data (Braun and Clarke 2006). The conceptual frameworks of sensemaking, the principles of 
forecasting, and judgement and decision-making were applied to the responses. A list of relevant 
responses that applied to each framework component was created that included a small 
explanation of why the researcher classified the response in that way. The conceptual 
frameworks were then assembled into a simple forecasting process model. The model and 
concepts will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
Chapter takeaways: 
- Nine extreme rainfall events in the SCIPP region were identified between 2015 and 2019. 
- 21 NWS forecasters were interviewed about those events in semi-structured phone 
interviews in 2018 and 2020. 
- Questions addressed participant demographics, model output, extreme rainfall event 
experience, confidence in the event(s), forecast communication, uncertainty information 
related to these events, and how forecasters perceived the events in relation to climate 
change. 
- Data were then qualitatively analyzed using deductive reasoning.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
How forecasters internally process and externally communicate extreme rainfall events 
can be organized into a model similar to those in Lejano et al. (2016) (Fig. 2.1) and Hoffman et 
al. (2017) (Fig. 2.2). From the macro scope of Lejano et al. (2016), Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
movement of information from the source (data) to the organization, in this case, the NWS, 
where it is translated (intra-organizational processes) by the forecasters into information that can 
be distributed to the receiver (forecast presentation). Adding more detail, the Hoffman et al. 
(2017) Base Model of expertise starts the process with identifying the “problem of the day” 
(forecast purpose), then examining data and going through sensemaking processes to make 
judgements and taking a “course of action” (forecast presentation). Sensemaking and decision-
making processes not only apply to forecasting an event, but they also consider the sensemaking 
and decision-making processes that their audiences will go through, impacting how the forecast 
is presented. Forecast uncertainty will always be present (Hoffman et al. 2017), is identified in 
the intra-organizational processes, and impacts how the forecast is presented. This chapter will 
discuss how the forecasters’ responses align with these models and frameworks. Forecaster 
identifiers have been removed to maintain participant anonymity and will be referred to by their 
interviewee numbers (I1, I2, I3, etc.). Extreme rainfall events will be referred to as [event].  
  
Figure 4.1: A simple forecasting process model that applies sensemaking, decision-making, and principles of 
forecasting to the extreme rainfall forecast and communication process 
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4.1 Forecast purpose 
 Whether it is a “quiet” weather day or an extreme event is imminent, the forecaster must 
be aware of the true purpose of the forecast they are publishing as they start the forecast process 
(Fig. 4.2). Forecasters think about what decisions will be made with that forecast and what is 
needed to make those decisions (Armstrong 2001b). Forecasters talked about the importance of 
knowing partner thresholds and limits when forecasting an event: “if it takes them [emergency 
management] three hours to move high water vehicles or to move boats, that helps us better 
understand if we’re seeing the trends changing within that three-hour time frame, we can give 
them a heads up” (I16). Occasionally, partners will ask for specific information to be included in 
a briefing ahead of time (I9). This helps the forecasters narrow down what physical features they 
need to focus on, as “it’s [the forecast] gotta have a firm foundation in science.” (I14). With the 
media and the public, the information needed may not be as specific. Forecasters stated that the 
media “probably would like to know a maximum amount and so forth because that does play 
well to many viewers” (I4). They also shared that the media had told them that they won’t 
present probabilistic information on air, as “It kind of gets over the heads of the public and they 
only have so much time allotted to them” (I6). One forecaster said that they try and keep public 
forecasts as simple as possible while still making them aware of a potential threat because the 
public doesn’t “have all the decisions that an EM does. They’re not having to make these large-
scale early decisions for a lot of people. Generally, the public wants to know ‘what’s going to 
happen to me?’” (I18). With the purpose of the forecast in mind, forecasters can begin to process 
the data in front of them.  
  
Figure 4.2: The simple forecasting  process model, focusing on where the purpose of the forecast fits in, along 
with an example quote from a participant 
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4.2 Intra-organizational processes: sensemaking 
 With the awareness of the purpose of their forecasts, sensemaking processes help NWS 
meteorologists interpret the various data sources available to them. These sensemaking processes 
(Weick et al. 2005) include organizing flux, noticing and bracketing, retrospect, presumption, 
social and systemic, organizing through communication, representativeness (Doswell 2004), and 
action.  
4.2.1: Organizing flux 
 Every day, forecasters have access to more data than they can possibly assess and must 
determine what is most important to look at and determine which data are most important 
(Daipha 2015). Forecasters identify organization in the chaos of data overload, or organize flux 
(Butterworth 2010). When forecasters see multiple models over multiple runs pointing to a high-
impact rain event over a large area, they know that outcome is likely not wrong (I3). When the 
forecasters recognize that the models are pointing to a high-impact rain event, they ask 
themselves: “‘can I debunk what’s happening in the model?’ If you can’t debunk what’s 
happening in the model and write it off to real reasons then you’re like ‘well, now I am proving 
why the model is right’” (I7). The forecaster can also start to ask themselves about the potential 
impacts they need to be concerned with if the event does occur for their area (I4). Forecasters can 
then work to answer those questions and investigate model output by analyzing specific 
products, such as I4 looking to specific parameters such as precipitable water, I7 determining 
what forcing mechanisms will play a role, or even I15 analyzing satellite images (for near-term 
forecasts). By organizing flux, forecasters can avoid being overwhelmed with information and 
can focus their attention on the task at hand.  
4.2.2 Noticing and bracketing: 
Part of the forecasting process, especially with high-impact events, is noting any 
departures from normal. By noting these differences, forecasters can begin making sense of the 
situation. For example, when a model produces a precipitation value that is greater than any of 
the others, the forecasters will take note. To some forecasters, it is an indication that “someone is 
going to get it” (I4). To others (n=9, 43%), the outlier can be considered the extreme maximum 
amount possible (I13). Some forecasters (n=5, 24%) felt that outliers were “like a drop in the 
bucket, I wouldn’t put much stock in it” (I3). However, most forecasters (n=15, 71%) agreed that 
an eye should be kept on that model outlier to see how other models and subsequent model runs 
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behave, as they know just one model with that outcome could be wrong, but if “other models 
start trending towards their solution, then we feel like they may have picked up on something” 
(I6).  
Forecasters not only use noticing and bracketing sensemaking processes in the short term 
but the long term as well. Some forecasters stated they noticed increasing frequency and/or 
intensity in extreme rainfall events. I13 noted that they “get these locally 1000-year frequency 
events, probably three or four times a year in our forecast area” and I8 observed that “amounts 
these days are a little higher than they were a decade ago”. However, when asked if that 
knowledge impacted how they handle major rainfall events, all forecasters said that is not 
something they consider leading up to or during the event as “it’s not attributed for a single 
event” (I7). This will be further discussed in later sections. 
4.2.3 Retrospect: 
 Retrospect is the sensemaking process that relies on past experience (Butterworth 2010). 
Based on previous events, forecasters can go into a potential extreme rainfall event knowing the 
nuances of different tools, such as a model being “a bit biased on the wet side” (I2) and adjusting 
accordingly. They can also identify tools that have not been used in the past that will help them 
make sense of the unfolding situation: “I think getting more experience with tools like that now, 
it would help us for an [event]-like situation” (I17). Experience with extreme rainfall events in 
the past also makes forecasters less likely to ignore model outliers: “The forecasters here get 
exposed to these events. I think what they bring to the table is they don’t ignore the outlier. They 
do consider it can happen” (I1). Seeing extreme rainfall events occur has opened forecasters’ 
minds to what used to seem impossible, as I12 put it: “Early in my career: ‘oh, that’ll never 
happen’ but this is [Gulf Coast state], it happens”. I12 also discussed that forecasters “try to learn 
from every one [event]” and will “go back and do more model calibration, [if] our models didn’t 
handle it right” so that they are better able to understand the next event. While past experience 
does guide forecaster sensemaking, forecasters also noted that each event is unique and that they 
approach each event differently (I5). 
4.2.4 Presumption: 
 Presumption is a basic sensemaking concept in the forecasting process, as forecasters are 
tasked with predicting how the situation will unfold and identifying the potential associated 
impacts. For example, I2 recalled deciding to increase the quantitative precipitation forecast 
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(QPF) to an extreme value because of the rainfall amounts they were seeing and how they 
thought the storm was going to evolve. Forecasters are also able to connect certain ingredients to 
extreme rainfall such as: “is it because it’s predicting the whole system to slow down? Are we 
gonna be in a much more favorable area for more training? Is it predicting more convection?” 
(I10). Forecasters are also aware of factors that will worsen impacts: “We knew that we, with the 
antecedent conditions leading up to this, (the soil was) pretty much saturated and it wasn’t gonna 
take much to produce high-impact flooding” (I6). However, to most accurately predict how a 
situation will evolve, sufficient observations are vital. I7 described: “we didn’t have any stream 
gauges upstream of [riverside town] at all at that time.” Without upstream gauges, they had no 
way of knowing what to expect outside of reports from local residents. This lack of upstream 
river stage observations significantly hindered their forecasting ability in that event.  
 Like noticing and bracketing, forecasters also use presumption when considering extreme 
rainfall events in the context of climatology and how that climatology is changing. Forecasters 
connect the predicted increase in frequency and intensity of these events as well as their impacts 
to what they know to be true, which could be as straightforward as “human activities resulting in 
increased greenhouse gasses resulting in extra moisture capacity of a warming planet. Also, 
humans increasing imperviousness of land as well with accordingly more runoff” (I11). Other 
forecasters took a deeper dive to prove to themselves that these events are increasing: “I’m 
digging into this because I want to prove to myself, is there something to this? And I’m pretty 
convinced there is something to this.” (I2). There were also forecasters who felt that the events 
may not be increasing, but the impacts are worsening due to human development: “The other 
component of the story is that man is tending to build in areas that are subject to impacts that can 
be rather dramatic. In other words, what I’m trying to say is, people are building in floodplains.” 
(I14). While what the forecasters think are causing these events to worsen are different, they are 
still connecting that trend to what they see as concrete evidence, which fits the presumption 
sensemaking concept.  
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4.2.5 Social and systemic: 
 Sensemaking can also be impacted by organizational constraints and other social factors 
(Weick et al. 2005). For example, forecasters do not think about the possible impacts of climate 
change when forecasting an event partially because they feel it is not their place: “we do not 
bring up climate change, anthropogenic influences, global warming, any of that. That is for the 
climate scientists, we stay in our lane, we let them handle that" (I12). Other forecasters said that 
linking the events to climate change is just outside of the time and space scale for which they are 
responsible (I13). Because forecasters have a definitive role of forecasting in the shorter term, 
they do not think about an event potentially being linked to climate change leading up to or 
during the event. However, they may think about climate change may be something they think 
about after the event when retrospectively thinking of the multiple 500-year events their area 
experienced in short succession (I14). Even then, forecasters are hesitant to focus on climate 
change in relation to these events as they feel that it is beyond the scope of their duties.  
4.2.6 Organizing through communication: 
 NWS forecasters are not alone when trying to make sense of an event but will work with 
others both in their office and in other offices to determine what is going on. I20 described 
looking at a co-worker as they both realized “this is going over the top, this is becoming… the 
entire entity of everything is becoming something we haven’t dealt with before”. This realization 
lead them to the decision that the first flood warning in twenty years for a major river in their 
area was necessary. WFOs participate in multi-office “conference calls where [national center] 
takes the lead on it and then each individual office provides input and we basically come to an 
Figure 4.3: As in Fig. 4.2 except focusing on where the sensemaking concept “social and systemic” fits in to the 
intra-organizational processes step of forecasting and communication. 
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agreement on amounts near our borders with neighboring offices” (I9). These calls also help the 
forecaster to see that other offices see what they see: “[Neighbor office] was noticing the same 
thing, [national center] was obviously coming up with the same thing, all of these independent 
sources, we were all arriving at the same conclusion and all of that really gives higher 
confidence” (I10). Through communication with others, both in their office and other offices, 
forecasters can make better sense of an event.  
4.2.7 Representativeness: 
 The sensemaking framework of representativeness is what NWS forecasters refer to as 
pattern recognition (Doswell 2004). When forecasters see a meteorological setup that is familiar 
to them, pattern recognition helps them figure out how the new event might unfold. For example, 
representativeness can help a forecaster catch an event that the models may not be picking up: 
“you get used to seeing patterns… you get a feel for everything may not be showing up in the 
models but ‘I’ve seen this before and there’s still something we gotta pay attention to’” (I15). 
Some forecasters recognize specific characteristics of a storm, such as slow movement or a lot of 
moisture, that could cause significant impacts somewhere in their area (I4). By recognizing 
patterns that tend to cause these issues, forecasters are better able to make sense of an impending 
event.  
4.2.8 Action: 
 The goal of sensemaking is to answer the questions “What is going on here” and then 
“What do I do next?” (Weick et al. 2005, p. 412). For example, forecasters are tasked with 
analyzing model output, which continues to improve, and “knowing when to basically say we 
can’t get any better than this and also knowing when we can say we can be better than this” (I2). 
Forecasters may use any of the above frameworks to distinguish between model output that 
needs improvement and that which does not. The actions that forecasters take as a result of these 
frameworks will be further discussed in the following sections.  
4.3 Intra-organizational processes: judgement and decision-making 
 When working an event, forecasters are likely influenced by unconscious heuristics and 
biases that will influence their decision-making (Millet et al. 2020). These include affect, 
anchoring and adjustment, availability bias, confirmation bias, and temporal/spatial myopia. 




 While experience with extreme events expands forecaster knowledge of such events, 
these events also take an emotional toll on the forecasters as they see the impacts unfold where 
they live (Smith 2020). This emotional toll can impact decision making, even for these highly-
trained professionals. This heuristic is called affect (Millet et al. 2020). An example of affect that 
impacts forecasting and communication is one office’s experience with two similar events. The 
first event devastated the area it hit, flooding thousands of homes. A few years later, another 
event looked like it was going to have similar impacts event so the office “put out a contingency 
forecast for the rivers and we actually put out flood warnings. It was based on getting X inches 
of rainfall and that would have had a lot of people flooding that did in [event] as well. And what 
do you know, we didn’t get but 2-3 inches of rainfall. It was a bust” (I13). Issuing such products 
before the rain has fallen is not often done in the NWS. It is entirely possible that the office 
responsible would not have issued those forecasts if the first event had not had such a significant 
societal impact on the region, including for families of forecasters.  
4.3.2 Anchoring and adjustment:  
 Anchoring and adjustment happen when one attaches themselves to an initial value and 
incrementally adjusts as new evidence comes in, even if the original value was not reliable 
(Millet et al. 2020). The NWS forecasting process works essentially the same way. Forecasters 
will publish an initial forecast and incrementally nudge that forecast based on the evolving 
evidence. For example, I8 described how their office adjusted their forecast as the event 
developed: “we under-forecasted the precip. totals initially but I think when we were in the heat 
Figure 4.4: As in Fig. 4.2 except focusing on where the decision-making concept “anchoring and adjustment” 
fits in to the intra-organizational processes step of forecasting and communication 
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of the event, we were increasing the totals based on what we were seeing.” While this heuristic is 
not necessarily within the control of the forecaster, it does influence how forecasts evolve with 
time.  
4.3.3 Availability bias: 
 Availability bias (Millet et al. 2020) is when someone cannot picture an event in their 
head, they are less likely to believe that it is possible. For example, based on experience in the 
area, one forecaster felt confident going into a significant event: “having grown up in this area 
and forecasting for this area for so long… I know we can get these [amount] rainfall bullseyes 
during May, especially during Memorial Day” (I6). While NWS forecasters periodically come 
across significant events across their careers, there are some events that are so extreme, that the 
forecaster themselves can barely believe what is happening. If models are predicting an amount 
of rain early on that seems extreme, forecasters may be wary about communicating that extreme 
value to their audiences: “We weren’t advertising X+ inches at that point yet…. ‘hey, it’s kind of 
far out to go all the way in, I think, given we haven’t experienced it before’” (I18).  
4.3.4 Confirmation bias: 
 Confirmation bias occurs when one seeks out information that aligns with their beliefs or 
the best possible outcome (Millet et al. 2020). I14 described that for some forecasters it may be 
“hard to recognize sometimes, some of these exceptional events because we tend to be in our 
own comfort zone.” They also emphasized the importance of being open to such an event: “I 
mean, be adaptable and you have to really listen to what the evidence here is trying to tell you. 
You'll have to use certain tools, techniques, etc. that you wouldn't necessarily use all the time”. If 
a forecaster is hesitant to put out a forecast that pushes them out of their comfort zone, that could 
result in negative consequences if the event did end up unfolding in an extreme way.  
4.3.5 Temporal/spatial myopia: 
 When a risk is underestimated or actions are not taken because the threat is far away 
temporally or spatially, that can cause temporal/spatial myopia (Millet et al. 2020). For example, 
I8 described a high-confidence event where they had to urge another forecaster to issue a watch 
outside of the normal timeframe. The forecaster was hesitant to do so because typically, that 
product would not be issued that far in advance. I8 was adamant that they had to “issue the watch 
now and give people adequate time to prepare and have that message sink in”. Forecasters 
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understand the importance of lead time. However, it is difficult to have precision with confidence 
far ahead of an event: "It would be difficult to say well ahead of time that this subdivision or this 
town is going to see property damage with homes being underwater and that obviously is an 
incredibly difficult thing to forecast out in advance” (I21). Like anchoring and adjustment, 
temporal/spatial myopia is a heuristic that is not necessarily within the control of the forecaster.  
4.4 Forecast uncertainty 
 In the inter-organizational processes of sensemaking and decision-making, forecasters 
encounter something that is inherent in weather forecasting and complicates forecast 
presentation: forecast uncertainty (Hoffman et al. 2017). This uncertainty is always present, and 
forecasters must know when to discuss an event despite the uncertainty as well as message that 
uncertainty to their audiences.  
 One example of forecast uncertainty is model consistency, “based on how the models are 
acting, you can convey your confidence levels. Consistency equals confidence. If they are 
bouncing around, you can message that you aren’t as confident” (I19). “When there’s better 
model consistency leading up to the event, we’re able to use stronger wording” (I21). Having 
increased confidence in an event allows forecasters to start messaging an event to their 
audiences. I5 recalled saying to their partners: “we’re a week out but we’ve had a lot of rainfall 
this [month]. The models are beginning to come into agreement, that there could be another 
heavy rainfall event developing. Please stay tuned everyday as we get more confident.” And that 
the confidence given by model consistency “really helped us to get the message out early that we 
did [have a] fair degree of high confidence that it was going to be another heavy rainfall event.” 
Two-thirds of the forecasters (n=14, 67%) mentioned that increased confidence allows them to 
talk about high amounts and significant impacts earlier on.   
Not only does confidence in a forecast allow for a longer lead time, it also helps 
forecasters discuss the potential for an extreme event. Forecasters “would not forecast an 
extreme amount like that unless there was a lot of model consistency, a lot of agreement among 
the models and we actually had very high confidence.” (I10). On the other hand, a lack of model 
consistency decreases confidence in an event: “occasionally they’d have a big signal but it would 
be in the wrong spot and it would be very inconsistent run to run compared to [first event], 
[second event] was much more uncertain than with [first event]” (I17). However, if an event 
appears it could be significant, forecasters may generally brief the possibility so that their 
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audiences can be aware, despite the lack of confidence, “that it wasn’t going to take a lot of 
rainfall to start getting high-impact issues. We used that wording in our email. That’s what we 
tried to message, even despite seeing in the models, the inconsistency from run to run” (I6). By 
starting with a general message, the forecasters can then start to add details to the forecast as the 
event gets closer. At first they are: “very general and give an overview and as the event gets 
closer then you can zone in on specific impacts, specific amounts that way. We have to adjust 
our messaging depending on how much lead time we have" (I12). 
 Even as the event begins, forecasts are still uncertain. Expressing the uncertainty in the 
forecast is something forecasters know they must do but are not sure how to best do so: “I 
definitely think that we should try to convey a level of confidence in particular events… how we 
do that I know is still up for debate on exactly what terms to use: 'likely', 'expected'” (I9). I10 
discussed the issues of creating standardized language to express uncertainty: “uncertainty- is 
very subjective to the forecaster, you could talk to 50 forecasters and probably get 50 different 
answers on their level of certainty on any event.” I7 noted that expressing probabilities of 
exceedance can be difficult as those levels may not be entirely accurate. They expressed that 
NOAA Atlas2, values may drastically change in places, and expressing those values may not be 
entirely accurate. While it is difficult to express uncertainty, forecasters cannot imply precision 
that they do not have. When asked about a forecast graphic that showed rainfall amounts to the 
hundredth of an inch I18 said that displaying the values that way was "a function of it being 
quick and easy when you have a lot of workload” but that, “if you go to the hundreds or the 
tenths that implies an accuracy you don't have. So, definitely when those amounts get up there in 
the 10s of inches you want to be talking in ranges."  
 
2 NOAA Atlas 14 is a precipitation frequency estimate database for the United States over various time periods and 
recurrence intervals (See Chapter 3, Section 1) 
Figure 4.5: As in Fig. 4.2 except focusing on where forecast uncertainty fits in to forecasting and 
communication processes. 
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 Forecasters do not all agree on how uncertainty should be conveyed: “each office is 
different, each shift in each office can be different depending on the dynamic on the shift and 
experience and what’s going on” (I20). Forecasters I8, I9, I10, I13, I16, I18, and I20 all stated 
that they prefer to use ranges of possible rainfall amounts to quantify uncertainty. One forecaster 
said they must ask themselves: “Are we good enough to give a single point forecast? But, when 
you have an [event] and you’re not quite sure exactly where it’s gonna set up until you’re in the 
event I think ranges are the way to go" (I8). I16 preferred ranges because "doing a pinpoint 
forecast like that tends to kind of handcuff you.” Nine forecasters (43%) discussed adding 
verbiage like "locally higher amounts" to their ranges and even specifying what those amounts 
could be. I20 felt it is better to describe it as: "’we expect 3 to 5 inches but there will be local 
amounts to 9 inches or local amounts of 9 inches are likely.’ instead of just saying ‘locally 
heavier’ or ‘We could see some 9-inch amounts’” (I20). Nine forecasters (43%) suggested the 
use of confidence levels, using words like “likely” or “expected”. Three forecasters (14%) said 
that they would prefer to stay away from the word uncertainty altogether, “I've noticed over my 
career whenever you talk about the forecast is uncertain, I feel like there is a large part of the 
population that looks at that as 'they're just flipping a coin' or 'they don't really know.'” (I15). 
They felt that it would be better to “at least be able to give them the spectrum of how bad it could 
be, I think is better than just messaging there's uncertainty", especially since they felt that 
audiences only focus on whether or not the event actually happens. Two (9.5%) forecasters 
discussed using probabilities of exceedance of a certain return interval while others (n=4, 19%) 
pointed out that return intervals are not always accurate and are changing. No uniform way to 
express uncertainty could cause consistency issues on the organizational level. 
 Not only does the expression of uncertainty vary between forecasters, but how it is 
expressed varies by the audience it is being presented to. Five (24%) forecasters said that they 
prefer to not express uncertainty to the public at all: "I don’t (express uncertainty), and I have not 
seen our office people use probabilities in our public-facing forecasts. Kind of internally talked 
about it and had a debate about it" (I6). Overall, the information that goes to the public is more 
general: "we went more away from showing deterministic values in a public forecast and going 
more towards here’s higher rainfall and here’s lower rainfall" (I7). However, forecasters can give 
more complicated information to their sophisticated partners and it has been increasingly 
common to "brief on two things: our expected forecast, so whatever range or deterministic value, 
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our actual expected forecast, and then we go kind of a little bit farther and we say 'But, here is a 
reasonable worst-case scenario'” (I10).  
Forecasters did have suggestions to improve uncertainty communication. For example, I7 
suggested creating a program that would display “the range of possibilities for your point and 
day” based on the type of event they were expecting. However, they also recognized that the 
technology to run those kinds of models in short amounts of time does not yet exist. A few 
forecasters discussed the importance of educating their audiences on interpreting uncertainty 
information. I13 said that “once a year our WCM (Warning Coordination Meteorologist) was 
going around and doing a Weather 101 for emergency managers so they understand uncertainty 
and understand the best way to get stuff from us." Such campaigns can ensure that audiences 
better understand what the NWS is trying to message.  
4.5 Forecast production: sensemaking 
 Once forecasters have a handle on the situation, including the uncertainty, they can think 
about how exactly they want to message the forecast. When they do so, they think about the 
sensemaking processes their audiences will go through when they receive this information. 
These processes include labeling, retrospect, presumption, action, and organizing through 
communication. 
4.5.1 Labeling:  
 Labeling connects the event to a word or phrase that will be familiar to the audience 
(Butterworth 2010). For example, assigning an event to a certain category changes how the event 
is seen by audiences, such as when the National Hurricane Center (NHC) names a storm. "People 
paid more attention to Harvey and Imelda because they actually had a name tied to them versus 
this no-name event... It really did catch people off guard” (I16). I16 also theorized that was the 
reason that Imelda got named. Forecasters will also use specific words to catch the attention of 
their audiences. I1 discussed making the decision to use the word “catastrophic”: “(we) had to do 
something, so that’s what we did. And it did go viral; I think thankfully it went viral... and also, I 
think really mobilized the national media and brought attention to the disaster unfolding." I17 
discussed adding uncertainty quantifiers to the labels: "I think it’s that headline… for example, 
'catastrophic flooding expected' the word 'expected' there is a confidence indicator or, 'the 
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potential for' you’re trying to communicate kind of the headline and that usually gets carried 
through the media” (I17). However, in order to maintain trust with the audience, it is important 
to avoid false alarms with such strong language and forecasters must “make sure you’re speaking 
correctly because when you use elevated terminology like this it will get people’s attention and 
you wanna make sure you're correct so we always have people second check it" (I12). 
4.5.2 Retrospect: 
 Not only do forecasters make sense of a situation using retrospect, but they think about 
how their audiences experience that sensemaking process as well. Forecasters know that partners 
will be more alert to an extreme rainfall threat if they have experienced an event before. I9 
recalled working with partners who had previously experienced a flooding event and noted that 
"those who had been impacted in [event] were certainly clued into what we were saying and they 
were very, very alert to the messaging that we were putting out." In addition to being more alert 
to a flooding threat, past events also inform partners to which areas are more prone to flooding 
and to give those areas special attention: “EMs told us they had gotten out earlier started telling 
people from the normal places that flood or whatever to get out” (I5). Since forecasters know 
what areas concern their partners the most, they know to discuss those problem spots in their 
briefings: "we start talking about it beforehand, especially with our hydrologist and say, 'Hey, 
what do you think is gonna happen in these areas and these areas and these areas, because we’re 
gonna get asked'” (I10). 
 
Figure 4.6: As in Fig. 4.2 except focusing on “labeling” and where sensemaking fits in to the step of the 
forecasting and communication process where forecasters consider the processes their audiences will use. 




 Presumption is another sensemaking component that forecasters anticipate their 
audiences using as they process an impending event. Like forecasters, partners will connect the 
current environmental situation to potential impacts later on. I5 recalled that their partners knew 
that more rain would cause significant impacts based on what they had recently seen: “they 
already knew that this area was saturated. There had been flooding, much lesser impact events 
but there had been some flooding events in the weeks leading up to this. They knew already that 
it couldn’t take much more.” When partners are aware of such a possibility, it raises a sense of 
urgency and attention to what the NWS forecasters are telling them.  
4.5.4 Organizing through communication: 
 Forecasters will communicate with their audiences to ensure that they understand the 
situation that is unfolding. For example, if a partner does not understand a situation, they can 
communicate with that partner individually to make sure they get it, as I18 recalled sitting down 
with decision-makers that thought the event was going to pass them. They explained: "'No, this 
band is gonna extend way [south] and through [city] and it's going to be a big feature we’re 
starting to see in our hi-res modeling' and I said 'you're definitely just as at risk.'” Forecasters will 
also share information with their decision-making audiences that may not be released to the 
public yet: "we were saying [amount], but we were actually briefing emergency managers it 
could be higher because we were starting to see the realization that it could potentially be higher 
but we didn’t publicize that" (I8). This allows decision-makers more time to act. 
 When messaging an event, it is extremely important for all entities across the weather 
enterprise to have a consistent message (Childs and Schumacher 2018). Message consistency is 
achieved by coordinating with their partners: "If we're saying one thing and then the media is 
saying another thing or if we’re saying one thing and other partners are saying another, that is 
where having that big headline that's coordinated is huge" (I16). Forecast and messaging 
coordination is not always easy, as I6 discussed the frustration of trying to get the media to shift 
focus from a tornado threat to a flood threat: “We solved it eventually through NWS Chat, 
getting the media to kind of not focus so much on these little, weak tornadoes and focus on this 
huge flood wave coming down the [river]. And so that was a challenge” (I6). 
 To communicate openly with partners and ensure message consistency, trust must be 
established during “quiet” times, before an event occurs. The NWS encourages this through 
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Integrated Warning Teams (IWT). IWT relationships are built by working with partners 
routinely. I14 described conducting weekly briefings with the partners so that: “when the chips 
are down, they feel more comfortable with us, rather than an occasional voice that they never 
heard from you in a long time or never heard of period. We build up this level of trust and 
confidence”. I14 also expressed concern that IWT relationships are not as strong as they once 
were because, “Coronavirus has obviously impacted operations. Everything is remote these days, 
we haven’t been able to get together with our partners for meetings for quite some time, so that’s 
had an impact on us.” When these relationships are strong, partners and audiences are more 
likely to believe the severity of the event.  
 Forecasters also rely on communication from their audiences to help make sense of a 
situation. Social media has increasingly become an avenue for storm report submission that 
anyone can use: “If they can click a picture and send it to us or they send it to someone else and 
we happen to see it, we can look up radar and things and get an idea of its validity” (I15). 
Keeping track of what the media is covering also helps with situational awareness when partners 
such as emergency managers are too busy to send in storm reports. For example, I10 recalled an 
instance where the office saw a traffic cam feed on The Weather Channel where “a body [of 
water] that was completely flooded over the interstate… it looked like they were driving through 
a river and it was the interstate and we all went 'where is that and why haven’t we heard about 
this?'” Social media and TV coverage greatly help forecasters with situational awareness.  
4.5.5 Action: 
 Once the audience has made sense of the impending event, they should be moved to 
action. Forecasters can provide actionable information to their audiences as they prepare for the 
event, such as having enough supplies to last a multi-day event (I8). Forecasters provide such 
information in hopes that their audiences take the threat seriously and do not put themselves in 
harm’s way during the event.  
4.6 Forecast creation: decision-making 
 Similar to sensemaking, forecasters also consider the decision-making frameworks that 
their audiences will use when handling an extreme rainfall event. These frameworks include 
affect, availability bias, confirmation bias, finite pool of worry, gambler’s fallacy, and loss 
aversion.  




 Similar to forecasters, their audience’s decision-making can be influenced by emotion. I5 
stated that “people are still very sensitive about rainfall” in the area that the event hit the hardest. 
I10 shared a similar experience, saying that people who live in a flood-prone region will become 
concerned "as soon as you mention heavy rain and flooding down here everybody's ears perk up 
and everybody starts paying attention and we just get swarmed with questions and swarmed with 
concerns.” These emotions towards extreme rainfall events could mean that audiences are more 
likely to decide to take appropriate action. 
4.6.2 Availability bias: 
 When a forecast end-user can picture an event in their head, they are more likely to be 
able to react appropriately. This means that forecasters must be able to communicate such 
imagery. Audiences can have trouble understanding numbers, as I17 described such an 
interaction with partners who didn’t quite grasp what the forecast meant: "there were some 
partners that were thinking 'Okay, that's 40 inches of rain but it's going to be spread out evenly so 
we’ll be okay, right?'” I3 also expressed frustration in the public’s interest in the numbers, and 
not in the actual message, and that message is, "’You’re all gonna get a massive amount of water 
and the rivers can’t handle that, nothing can… Your homes are gonna flood and roads are gonna 
be impassable.’” By relaying impacts rather than numbers, forecasters may provide a clearer 
message for their audiences. However, I3 also noted that sometimes it can be difficult to do that 
in a way that the public can relate to. 
Some forecasters will use past events to help their end-users understand the situation, 
“‘Do you remember when this happened? You had flooding of this magnitude, well what we are 
expecting is an event to be very similar to that’” (I2). However, it is important to keep in mind 
that some events or event details could have been forgotten about. I7 discussed each event 
having a “shelf life” of “less than ten years” with the exception of major events, meaning that 
people won’t necessarily remember the impacts to which forecasters are referring. It is also 
important for forecasters to keep in mind that people may be new to the area and may not have 
experienced that past event. I16 described that their area is growing so much in population that 
even though they frequently experience extreme rainfall events new residents: “when they hear 
of these rainfall rates or these rainfall amounts, they don't comprehend it because they've never 
experienced it before”. Forecasters also need to keep in mind that using past events to message 
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the impending threat is “effective but it’s also dangerous because some people will say 'Well, I 
didn't get flooded in [past event] so I don't have to prepare now' but it’s like 'No, this is a 
different event'" (I12). Referring to past events can be helpful, but each event is still unique. 
Sometimes, there are no past events to compare to, and forecasters must find a way to illustrate 
potentially unprecedented impacts. I13 described the challenge of messaging to their end-users 
that an event is "something that hasn’t happened before, so you have to prepare for worse than 
you’ve seen. That’s our biggest challenge… I think, how to convey stuff like that. People… they 
can only reference what they know or what they’ve seen before.”  
4.6.3 Confirmation bias: 
 Like forecasters, audiences also have a confirmation bias. For example, when briefing 
partners and thinking, “you're speaking very forcefully and you think you really laid out and 
nailed the forecast and half of them might get it, half of them still won't get it” (I17). With the 
public, forecasters are careful to avoid deterministic values, I8 felt that "people focus on 'they 
said we are gonna get 10.75 inches of rain and that’s what we’re gonna get and we won’t get any 
more' that’s the reason I stay away from specific deterministic values." When the audience 
latches on to a value like that and it doesn’t verify, it is possible that they will lose trust in NWS 
forecasts. The same goes for a missed location: “that leads to perception issues with the public 
that we’re missing events” (I6) even if the event did happen, just in a different location. 
Similarly, confirmation bias is why forecasters are hesitant to give the public the worst-case 
scenario an event could produce and that they have to let the public know “exactly how bad it 
can be, but not to fixate so much on the very highest end because people tend to have a thing 
where… they focus on what the worst thing could be” (I15). Message consistency across the 
weather enterprise plays a large role in making sure that the public does not latch on to a worst-
case scenario. Unfortunately, that’s not always the case and there could be “certain TV 
meteorologists at certain stations showing individual model run accumulations on the air that 
sometimes don’t agree with the messaging we’re saying. Sometimes they’re very worst-case 
scenario, sometimes they’re way under-done” (I6). Not only can this create confusion, but some 
members of the public may not be able to be convinced out of what they saw on television, 
meaning they could take too much or too little action or lose trust in future event forecasts if that 
particular scenario did not play out. 
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4.6.4 Finite pool of worry: 
 When facing an event, one can be overloaded with too many threats and will only focus 
on one or a few and ignore the others (Millet et al. 2020). For example, with one event, in the 
media "heavy rainfall and flooding was being mentioned but it was competing too much with 
'ooh look at this amazing storm on satellite and that it’s about to make landfall'” (I3). The media 
was so focused on the size of the storm, that they were not discussing the actual threats it was 
posing. For the same event, I2 discussed decision-making partners focusing on the wind and 
landfall of the storm and that they had to emphasize “the heavy rain and the devastating 
flooding… so that they understand that it’s gonna be a real problem for them and bring their 
attention back to the inland flood threat because that’s something they’re going to be dealing 
with.” It is up to the forecasters to make sure that their audiences are focused on the most 
imminent threat.  
4.6.5 Gambler’s fallacy:  
 While extreme rainfall events are rare, that does not necessarily mean that they cannot 
occur in short succession. NWS forecasters must be able to convince their audiences of this. 
Expressing event probabilities as return intervals complicates this, as the public may believe that 
a 100-year event can only happen once every 100 years. I12 notes that they have seen people in 
interviews say, “I don't understand how I could have three 100-year floods in two years.” For 
this reason, many forecasters may stay away from presenting uncertainty information using 
return intervals.  
 
Figure 4.7: As in Fig. 4.2 except, focusing on “gambler’s fallacy” and where decision-making fits in to the step 
of the forecasting and communication process where forecasters consider the processes their audiences will use. 
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4.6.6 Loss aversion: 
 People are more likely to heed safety information if it is framed as what could be lost 
rather than what could be gained if specific actions are taken (or not taken) (Millet et al. 2020). 
NWS forecasters can use this to their advantage when relaying safety information to their 
audiences. They want their audiences to understand just how dangerous flooding can be, but 
often the public does not grasp that danger. I21 discussed the issue of people trying to cross 
flooded roadways overnight and that the public should understand that as long as their home isn’t 
flooding, they "need to shelter in place, stay there and not be on the roadways during some of 
these events because that's what we see, somebody will drive through a low water crossing and 
then lose their lives." I14 said that the biggest thing they want their audience to understand is that 
they: “you really need to pay attention and take measures to protect yourself and the best you can 
with your property. If you don't, you could run into some bad things such as drowning, losing 
your property.” They hope that describing possible consequences will help their end-users make 
decisions that will save lives. 
4.7 Forecast presentation 
 The culmination of the forecast purpose, intra-organizational processes, forecast 
uncertainty, and the sensemaking and decision-making frameworks influenced by outside forces 
is the presentation of the forecast. This is the product that is seen by end-users and used for their 
decision-making. If the forecast is not presented in a useful way, even if it is a great forecast, it 
will have very little value if it cannot be used. 
 Not every forecast is presented in the same way. For example, not every meteorological 
variable is presented in the same way. I1 discussed being able to use numbers when presenting 
variables like heat index or snowfall to their audiences but that they try and stay more qualitative 
Figure 4.8: As in Fig. 4.2 except focusing on where forecast presentation fits in to forecasting and 
communication processes. 
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with things like rainfall impacts, and that how they express the forecast “does vary by element”. 
I4 recalled using numerical rainfall forecasts for an extended event but that they “didn’t really go 
for the storm total, more or less we tried to keep it along the lines of 12-24-hour amounts, 
additional this, additional that" to help their audiences understand the event as it happened. 
Sometimes, both numbers and actions to mitigate potential impacts will be presented: "When we 
were briefing to the public, we were saying 8-12 inches of rain, prepare sandbags, take actions 
that you need to take now before flooding starts" (I8). However, the forecasters seemed to agree 
that when they are forecasting extreme rainfall events, overall impacts are much more 
meaningful than numbers, especially “once you get to a certain amount, little differences in 
numbers don't matter anymore, it's about impacts” (I7). Forecasters also wanted to focus on 
impacts as they felt that their audiences may not understand what quantitative forecasts were 
saying:. I12 discussed avoiding "sayng a rainfall QPF without context of the impacts… we 
realize that you just can't throw out a QPF forecast and expect everyone to be able to read it the 
way it’s meant to be read" (I12). For this reason, forecasters will push “more impacts and safety 
in the emails” (I6). They still provided numbers but emphasized the impacts and proper 
precautions to take. While impacts are important, I18 said that forecasters still need to focus on 
the science of the impacts: “our focus has really been on trying to complete the picture with 
inundation but that requires fairly accurate rainfall.” Without a good forecast, they cannot 
accurately convey the impacts. 
How the forecast is presented also depends on the audience that is being addressed, as 
different audiences have different levels of understanding. I7 expressed that they had little faith 
in what the public could handle: "I don’t think that the public is capable of understanding much 
in math, I just don’t. I think that they need survival skills education." Generally, the forecasters 
try and keep public-facing information as simple as possible. I19 described providing a 
straightforward forecast that was a “best guess, which may be a little deterministic. With the 
public, you have to be careful because they have a confirmation bias. If it didn’t rain where they 
were or isn’t as much as you say, it didn’t happen anywhere.” However, with partners “you can 
give a broader scope. You can provide different scenarios to them.” But, “the media cannot be 
included on those scenarios because you don’t want them to run off with what are just scenarios” 
(I19). Overall, the forecasters seemed to agree that when giving forecast information, with the 
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“general public there’s probably more qualitative language and then as you get towards 
emergency management it’s more quantitative" (I1). 
When working with sophisticated partners such as emergency management, forecasters 
rely heavily on in-person, conference call, and/or e-mail briefings when dealing with high-impact 
events. I15 described the “constant flow of communication” between their office and emergency 
managers up to three to five days leading up to an event: "email communication, phone 
communication, and maybe even in-person briefings depending on the event, we've done that 
multiple times or they can even be video briefings, now in this COVID environment. But it just 
ramps up as we get closer". During these briefings, the forecasters focus on messages such as 
"what the various threats are, what our degree of confidence in these threats are, when will the 
onset of threatening conditions occur, how bad could it be… when do we expect things to get 
better, and any lingering impacts" (I14). By hosting “many conference calls and meetings” (I11) 
forecasters make sure that their partners are receiving the message. Some offices will have 
forecasters practice giving briefings by conducting them routinely even when the weather is 
quiet “our forecasters get the practice so they go through presenting basically a briefing-type of 
scenario but it's just a generic 90 seconds 'Hey, here's a look ahead through the week' or 'this is a 
look into your weekend'” (I20).  
When briefing partners, forecasters will provide them with various possible scenarios. 
For example, in a briefing I17 described potential storm tracks that would result in different 
outcomes, "We had to kind of present both scenarios that if it follows that eastern track, we're on 
the drier side. So, you almost have to kind of verbally flush some of this out when you're talking 
to partners" (I17). Forecasters also talked about using briefings to help their partners prepare by 
telling them "the worst possibilities so they can make the decisions themselves instead of being 
caught in the middle of an event, having to catch up… they want to have that sand ready for 
people to put in bags" (I13). For example, in addition to what is communicated to the public and 
the media, they will “take it a step further saying, 'we could see a worst-case scenario of X 
inches” (I8) with their emergency managers. Discussing these scenarios are a possible way for 
forecasters to figure out "how to properly communicate outliers in the models and how to use, 
not worse-case scenarios, but reasonable worst-case scenarios and how to brief that." (I6). 
Forecasters hesitate to share this information with the public because “you don't want them to get 
so fixated on either the best-case scenario or the worst-case scenario because people tend to 
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gravitate to those extremes" (I15). As far as sharing the worst-case scenario with the media, 
forecaster’s opinions were divided. Some forecasters felt that as far as media understanding that 
they are only possible situations, “they get it” (I15) while others were worried about the media 
sensationalizing the worst-case scenario for reasons discussed in section 4.6.3. 
The relationships between the NWS forecasters and their audiences strengthen the 
presentation of the forecasts. With in-person, video, and phone briefings body language and tone 
of voice go a long way in conveying the severity of the situation. I20 recalled people telling them 
that "they could judge the severity of my concern about the event based on my tone of voice and 
what words I was using even though it was something that was just unintentional, I was just 
being more conversational." I18 recalled a time that an emergency manager asked them if they 
should prepare for evacuations and that they “looked up and he didn’t even wait for me to 
answer the question, he saw how worried I was from some of the stuff that was coming in, some 
of the information we were seeing in the modeling.” Partners also know that they can reach out 
for more information: "we'll brief something and then we'll get a call from the EM and the 
elected official saying, 'Are you serious?, 'Is that really what you think? We're going to have to 
make some decisions'" (I17). In fact, I20 talked about how “pretty much every EM in our area is 
comfortable with shooting us a text message saying, ‘what you think?’ which is kind of cool.” A 
few forecasters expressed concern that such connections with partners could be lost or weakened 
due to the remote nature of things due to the pandemic.  
In addition to briefings and one on one interactions, offices also have email lists that 
distribute briefing information to their audiences. I4 described, "when we do our webinars, we 
email our slides out, the slides are shared on social media.” These emails are distributed to a 
large audience, I5 estimated that about 1000 people received the slides and could forward the 
slides to others. Forecasters will also use NWS Chat to distribute information, especially to the 
media who are usually not involved in the briefings. The media can ask questions in chat and the 
forecasters can also give them a heads up that they’re going to “put out warnings we might put 
into chat that, 'Hey, tornado warning or a flash flood warning is about to come out for this 
specific area.' so NWS chat is definitely a huge communication aspect between with the media" 
(I16). The media can also request to interview NWS forecasters, "some over the telephone, 
sometimes a crew would come out and do a stand up interview, now we’ve got the capability of 
producing a video outside at our station for a video interview" (I14). 
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The NWS now also has the opportunity to become more public facing through their use 
of social media. Before, “the only way that people could, members of the general public, could 
ask us questions would be to maybe email the office, which wouldn't necessarily be a prompt 
response, or they would have to call the office” (I10). With social media, the forecasters can 
reach a large portion of their public: "I think it is probably the greatest tool we have. I think it's 
drastically better than NOAA Weather Radio and it's just the fastest way to get information out 
and we get so many more reports that way as well" (I13). Forecasters can use social media to 
share more detailed information with the public. They can discuss the development of the 
situation, possible rainfall amounts, and how things could change and that it is a “good way to at 
least give the public a little bit more of what we're thinking as far as uncertainty and the actual 
threat” (I21). However, forecasters are aware that social media is not without flaws. I19 
expressed concern that “on social media, you are dealing with so many different people, not just 
a few that it is difficult to establish relationships” (I19). A few forecasters also expressed concern 
that the graphics they post could be manipulated, "There's been examples of people taking like 
an NHC graphic, keeping the logo and then changing the information on the graphic… trying to 
emulate official sources. " (I18). Although social media is not perfect, forecasters felt like it has 
become an incredibly useful tool. 
There are many tools available to a forecaster when they present forecast information. It 
doesn’t matter what format is used, but as long as it is usable by their audiences. As I14 said, “If 
we can't communicate in language that the public understands, then it doesn't matter how 
confident we are. It does matter how smart we are, but we gotta be able to communicate with 
people in terms that they can understand.” There are certain things that forecasters specifically 
want to convey to the public. They want to make sure that people are prepared and in a safe place 
before the event starts: “if you live in a low-lying area that's prone to flooding, maybe you 
should consider going to a relative’s home or trying to find an alternate place to stay during that 
time" (I9). They want each person to know potential impacts and to be able to “understand how 
my forecast relates to their danger level and what it could mean with potentially being in harm’s 
way and what kind of actions they need to take to stay safe." (I10). 
Chapter Takeaways 
- The extreme rainfall forecast and communication process can be depicted in a simple 
forecasting process model. 
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- Forecasters start by identifying the purpose of their forecast, especially what decisions 
will be made using the forecast and what information is needed to make those decisions. 
- Forecasters use sensemaking processes to understand the evolving weather situation. 
- Their decisions leading up to and during the event are impacted by heuristics and biases. 
- Forecast uncertainty is inherent and forecasters do not agree on how to express it. 
- Forecasters also consider the sensemaking and decision-making processes that their 
audiences will go through. 
- Finally, forecasters decide how to effectively present forecasts to various audiences. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
How forecasters translate their meteorological knowledge into useful forecast 
information for their audiences has not been widely studied (Morss et al. 2015, 2011). This study 
helps address that knowledge gap. A basic understanding of the forecasting and communication 
processes of extreme rainfall events can be depicted in a simple forecasting process model (Fig. 
4.1). This model combines two pre-existing models (Lejano et al. 2016 and Hoffman et al. 2017, 
Figs. 2.1 And 2.2, respectively) as well as forecasting principles (Armstrong 2001b) and the 
conceptual frameworks of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005; Butterworth 2010; and Doswell 
2004) and decision-making (Millet et al. 2020). Applying these frameworks and principles to the 
interview data provide insight into how NWS forecasters operate leading up to and during 
extreme rainfall events. Specifically, how they process model outliers, communicate those 
outliers and outlying events, and whether they connect these events to climate change.  
Forecasters go through sensemaking processes as they address the evolving weather 
situation, including extreme rainfall events. Forecasters get better at handling these events as 
they gain experience and can use retrospect to identify things like how certain tools are biased. 
Forecasters who have seen extreme rainfall events before are also more likely to see an extreme 
amount of precipitation in the models and accept it as a possibility. However, when forecasters 
have not seen an event of that magnitude, and cannot imagine such an event, they may be more 
hesitant to put out that forecast, especially without strong evidence (availability bias). Seventeen 
(81%) of the forecasters mentioned recognizing which current features could lead to potential 
impacts (presumption), like seeing that a system is moving slower than expected, so it will dump 
more rain over the area. They will use pattern recognition (representativeness) as well to make 
sense of an event and are able to identify ingredients to an extreme rainfall event in their area. 
However, it is important to realize that these forecasters are human, and some of their decisions 
can be impacted by emotion, especially if they have worked a significant, impactful event and an 
incoming event has the potential to lead to similar outcomes (affect). Also, forecasters never 
process these events alone. Sixteen of the forecasters (76%) talked about communicating with 
other forecasters, both in their own office and in other offices as well to make sure that everyone 
is aware of the same features and on the same page (organizing through communication). By 
calling on their own experiences as well as their colleagues’ expertise, forecasters can make 
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better sense of the weather situation, and experience with extreme rainfall events will make them 
more open to acknowledging model outliers as a possibility. 
There are also organizational policies that dictate operations in a WFO and impact 
forecaster sensemaking and decision-making. For example, with QPF products forecasters will 
anchor themselves to an initial forecast, and only adjust that forecast incrementally as new 
evidence comes in (anchoring and adjustment) based on NWS procedures. This prevents drastic 
changes between products, which could create confusion or a lack of trust (Daipha, 2015). There 
is also guidance on how far out from the event certain products should be published, which may 
make some forecasters hesitant to issue the product further in advance, even if there is high 
confidence that the product will be needed (social and systemic). Other forecasters may want to 
issue the product anyway, to give more lead time to their audiences. These policies exist to 
provide structure for operations, and it is important to note that they impact the forecast and 
communication process.  
Model output is a major input to the forecasting process, especially as model output 
continues to improve (Schumacher 2017). Forecasters are increasingly tasked with the challenge 
of whether or not to keep the output as is or take action and adjust it according to other evidence 
they are seeing. While forecasters have a lot of information to process (Daipha 2015; Doswell 
2004) and forecasters may struggle interpreting ensemble guidance (Wilson et al. 2018), 
consistent model output helps them organize that chaos. Twenty forecasters (95%) said that 
when models are consistent run-to-run and with each other in signaling an extreme rainfall event, 
that event will likely come to fruition. This helps the forecasters identify what they need to focus 
on and look for in the data (organizing flux). If the model consistency continues, the forecasters 
will have more confidence in the event. With that confidence, forecasters can start to message 
the possibility of an extreme event with greater lead time Forecasters use model guidance to gain 
an understanding of an event. When models consistently point to an extreme rainfall event, that 
primes forecasters’ attention towards that event. Continued consistency and agreement help 
forecasters communicate these events with greater lead time and confidence. Model outliers are 
closely monitored by the forecasters as a potential outcome.  
 Even if every model in every model run was showing the same outcome, there will 
always be uncertainty in the forecast (Schumacher 2017) and forecasters must decide how to 
communicate that uncertainty, as they do not want to imply accuracy that they do not have. How 
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forecasters convey uncertainty is a significant challenge, especially since that uncertainty is not 
objective and forecasters will each express how confident they are in a forecast in their own way. 
When asked how they felt how uncertainty should be conveyed, forecasters provided a variety of 
answers. Forecasters suggested the use of confidence levels, probabilities of exceedance, and 
ranges of possible amounts. Some forecasters even try to avoid uncertainty with the public in 
general as they felt that the public is not capable of understanding such information without 
losing trust in the forecast (Rouleau 2016). Previous studies have found that forecasters do not 
feel like the public can understand probabilistic uncertainty information (Daipha 2015; Stewart et 
al. 2015; and Demeritt et al. 2010). While audiences and forecasters alike struggle with the 
correct definition of probabilistic information (Gigerenzer et al. 2005; Morss et al. 2008; Stewart 
et al. 2015; Daipha 2015), better decisions are made with uncertainty expressed in the forecast 
(LeClerc and Joslyn 2015; Fundel et al. 2019; Roulston and Kaplan 2009). Grounds et al. (2018) 
also found that probabilistic information also leads to better decisions than using return intervals 
to convey uncertainty. In this study, five (24%) forecasters felt that they could use probabilities 
effectively with the public, while six (29%) said that the public cannot understand probabilities. 
However, four (19%) forecasters said that the public uses probabilistic information every day, 
like in fantasy football apps, so they should be able to understand it in the context of weather as 
well.  
As far as solutions to expressing uncertainty, three forecasters simply said that they did 
not know what the solution would be. One forecaster suggested creating a model that provides a 
range of possibilities for a point and time but acknowledged that the technology for that does not 
exist yet. Three forecasters discussed using education campaigns to help users understand 
uncertainty information. One forecaster said that they need help from social scientists to figure 
out the best way to express uncertainty. While there is no consensus on how uncertainty 
information related to extreme rainfall events should be communicated, forecasters have ideas 
and are willing to work with researchers to establish the best way to do so. 
 When communicating these events, forecasters also must ensure that the messages being 
sent to users are consistent. Consistent with previous findings (Daipha 2015; Childs and 
Schumacher 2018; Sherman-Morris et al. 2018), forecasters ensure consistency by discussing the 
message within their offices, with other NWS offices, and with their decision-making and media 
partners (organizing through communication). They will make sure that their decision-making 
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users are properly understanding what is happening in the event as well as try to make sure that 
their media partners are sticking to the same message that they are. Six (29%) forecasters said 
that if the media happens to broadcast a worst-case scenario model run, the public may latch on 
to that scenario (confirmation bias), which can cause unnecessary panic or decrease trust in 
forecasts when that worst-case scenario does not pan out. This is something that the forecasters 
try to discourage, but it is not always within their control. Through communication within the 
NWS and with partners, forecasters ensure that the communication of extreme rainfall events is 
consistent across the weather enterprise. 
 How forecasters present forecast information depends on a few factors. The 
meteorological variable in question is one example. Forecasters felt that variables like heat index 
could be presented numerically while others like hail size should be presented qualitatively. With 
rainfall, some forecasters said that ranges of variables could be presented, but most (n=15, 71%) 
agreed that communicating the impacts associated with that rainfall is more effective than the 
actual amount of rain. By describing potential impacts and even recommended protective 
actions, users are better able to picture the threat in their head than they are just amounts of 
rainfall, and thus will better understand the event (availability bias). How the event is 
communicated is also dependent on lead time. Further out from the event, uncertainty is high and 
fewer details are known. For this reason, forecasters will start out with general messaging that 
there will be a heavy rainfall event, then as the event gets closer and more information is 
available, they can start narrowing down locations, amounts, and especially impacts and convey 
that to their users. This is consistent with Bostrom et al. (2016).  
Consistent with existing literature (e.g.: Rouleau 2016 and Sanders et al. 2020), 
forecasters discussed that the audience also impacts how forecasts for these events are 
communicated. How forecasters communicate with the public has grown in importance over the 
last several years. Seventeen (81%) forecasters discussed how social media has allowed them to 
interact more with the public. Social media allows the public to directly ask them questions as 
well as easily submit storm reports, helping with forecasters’ situational awareness. For the 
public, nine (43%) forecasters felt that the information should be kept relatively simple. The 
public is mostly concerned with what will happen to them personally, and do not have as many 
decisions to make as sophisticated partners like emergency managers. Forecasters felt that the 
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only information that needs to be communicated to the public is impact information and how 
they can protect themselves and their property.  
With sophisticated partners like emergency managers, forecasters can provide more 
complicated information. Forecasters give weather briefings to these partners, and they are a 
main channel of communication between the forecasters and these sophisticated users. Eleven 
forecasters (52%) said that in these briefings, they can give partners various possible scenarios, 
such as the most likely scenario or the worst-case scenario. The worst-case scenario can be based 
on model outliers. Forecasters also try to be aware of thresholds that partners have for certain 
decisions (forecast purpose). That way, they can prioritize that information in their briefings. 
Nine (43%) forecasters said that by conducting regular briefings and meetings, even when the 
weather is “quiet”, they establish relationships with these partners, which will then increase 
partner trust in the forecasts (Bostrom et al. 2016; Kuonen et al. 2019). Six (29%) forecasters 
said that these relationships allow partners to feel comfortable asking for specific information 
and three (14%) said that partners know them so well that they can understand the severity of the 
threat off of body language and tone of voice. Forecasters can also use these relationships to 
directly communicate with partners that they feel are not properly understanding the severity of 
the threat. They can directly tell that partner what they think will happen and why, making sure 
they are on the same page (organizing through communication). For some offices, these briefings 
are solely for decision-makers and the media is rarely involved in the meetings or calls while 
others do include the media. However, the slides from the briefings are often mailed out to a 
wider group of people that could include the media. However, five (24%) forecasters said that 
they mostly interact with the media through NWS chat and occasionally will do interviews with 
them. When communicating with these more sophisticated partners, forecasters can incorporate 
more complex information, such as various possible outcomes. Some forecasters said that they 
use model outliers as possible worst-case scenarios.  
 No matter who they are presenting the forecast to, forecasters need their audiences to be 
able to understand the significance of an impending extreme rainfall event. In order to convey 
the events in ways that will help this understanding, forecasters consider the sensemaking and 
decision-making processes that their audiences will go through to understand the event. One-
third (n=7) of forecasters felt that audiences are better able to understand and react to an extreme 
rainfall event if they have experienced an extreme rainfall event in the past (retrospect). Four 
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(19%) forecasters said that they use this to their advantage and use past events to message the 
incoming event so that the audience can better picture the incoming event (availability bias). 
However, seven (33%) forecasters were hesitant to use past events, as no two events will be alike 
and even if the flooding will be similar, it will likely be in different places, which may not be 
something that the public understands. It is also possible that a forecast user may not believe that 
a storm can behave in a certain way if no storm they have seen before has done that 
(confirmation bias). Users may also believe that if they have recently experienced a rare rainfall 
event that it is not possible for another one to come in short succession (gambler’s fallacy), 
which is another challenge forecasters face when communicating these events. Just over half 
(n=11, 52%) of the forecasters said that they will label events using words like “catastrophic” to 
message the event in a way that allows audiences to link the event to a word that they are 
familiar with, and will be able to better understand the significance of the event. Forecasters also 
know that their users, especially the high-end users, can connect current conditions to future ones 
(presumption). For example, they know that when there has been a lot of rain recently that it will 
not take much more to get significant flooding impacts. Once the audience understands the 
significance of the event, they can decide which actions they should or should not take. These 
decisions can be emotionally driven, especially if the user has experienced an extreme rainfall 
event in a way the negatively impacted them, creating fear when another extreme rainfall event is 
approaching, which can adversely impact the decisions they make (affect). To help their 
audiences make rational decisions, forecasters first make sure that the messaging is focusing on 
the most dangerous threat. When faced with multiple threats, it is not uncommon for people to 
focus on just one (finite pool of worry), so forecasters will try and make sure both they and their 
partners are messaging whichever threat poses the most danger. They will also message to the 
audience what could be lost if the correct actions are not taken, as that is more effective than 
messaging what could be gained (loss aversion). Eight (38%) forecasters discussed the 
importance of making sure that their audiences can properly understand the potential impacts of 
an extreme rainfall event and then take the correct actions to protect themselves, their families, 
and their property. Forecasters consider the sensemaking and decision-making processes that 
their audiences will go through in order to better communicate extreme rainfall events.  
 Extreme rainfall events are projected to increase in frequency and intensity due to climate 
change (Mullens et al. 2013; Hayhoe et al. 2018). However, when forecasters are working these 
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events, they are not thinking about the potential impacts that climate change could have on the 
event. Most (n=18, 86%) forecasters are noticing that these events are happening more 
frequently or are becoming more intense when they happen (noticing and bracketing). However, 
they feel that connecting the impacts of climate change on these events is beyond their role as 
forecaster (social and systemic), which Hoffman et al. (2017) also discussed. Forecasters also 
mentioned that they already have so much information in front of them that they also do not have 
the time to make those connections. However, they may consider the impact that climate 
changed could have played in an event after the event has passed.  
 Applying sensemaking and decision-making frameworks, as well as principles of 
forecasting, can create a basic understanding of extreme rainfall forecast and communication 
processes by NWS forecasters. In previous studies, models have been created to depict 
forecasting processes (Morss et al. 2015; Bostrom et al. 2016; Hoffman et al. 2017). Similarly, 
these concepts can be put into a simple forecasting process model (Fig. 4.1) to help visualize this 
high-level understanding of extreme rainfall event forecast and communication processes. It is 
important to note that this model is simpler than the actual forecast process, but it does still 
provide insight. This simple model helps answer the research questions investigated by this 
project. When forecasters see a model outlier in their data, they will not immediately dismiss it, 
but they also will not accept it right away. Instead, they will monitor the model output to see if it 
disappears or if other models and runs come into agreement. Some forecasters, especially those 
who have experienced extreme rainfall events, may acknowledge model outliers as possible 
maximum amounts and might even brief them as worst-case scenarios to their sophisticated 
partners. Communication of extreme rainfall events is dependent on confidence in the event as 
well as the audience being addressed. For example, forecasters tend to provide simpler, more 
impacts-based information to the public and more complicated information to their sophisticated 
partners. Finally, while most forecasters are aware of climate change and the expected increase 
in these events, it is not something that is considered when forecasting or communicating 
extreme rainfall events during and leading up to the event. However, it is something that the 
forecasters may consider when they reflect on the event after it occurs. 
While this study addressed the research questions and provided insight into the forecast 
and communication process, it also highlighted challenges that forecasters face when working 
extreme rainfall events. First, forecaster confidence is highly dependent on consistent model 
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output. However, that is not always the case, and models may not be in agreement or there could 
be outliers in the output. In those situations, forecasters stated that they will monitor model 
output until the guidance is a little clearer, especially when dealing with model outlier suggesting 
a rainfall amount that the forecaster has never seen before and they have to decide whether or not 
that outlier is believable. While this works, it also can decrease forecast lead time, giving 
audiences less time to prepare for what could be significant impacts. To address this challenge, a 
model verification suite could be developed for forecasters to refer to. This suite would provide 
information on how models performed in previous events. This information would include the 
distribution of model output, especially the cluster of output and the outliers, as well as what 
actually happened. Forecasters could use this information to get an idea of how models have 
handled similar events in the past and use that knowledge to help decide how to interpret model 
output from the current event. Many forecasters did say that they communicated model outliers 
to their partners as a potential worst-case scenario for localized areas. This tool could also prove 
or disprove that way of thinking. If it is found that high-end model outliers do end up coming to 
fruition as localized maximum rainfall amounts, that could be something that forecasters could 
start briefing to all audiences, although there would need to be additional work done on how to 
do so effectively.  
Forecasters also struggle with forecast uncertainty. Uncertainty can be subjective, so each 
forecaster might have a different level of confidence. Forecasters also do not agree on how 
forecast uncertainty can be expressed to various audiences. The most common suggestion was 
ranges and many forecasters felt that the public cannot understand probabilistic information. 
However, a few forecasters and the literature (Fundel et al. 2019; Roulston and Kaplan 2009) 
feel that the public can understand probabilities when they are presented in an understandable 
way. To address this issue, work should be done to ensure that uncertainty information is 
expressed consistently across the NWS. To accomplish this, research on the production and 
interpretation of probabilistic information in weather forecasts should be expanded. For example, 
some WFOs have started to publish graphics on their social media pages that include 
probabilistic information. Studies into how the public views that information as well as how the 
offices decided on using that information should be done. It would also be useful to conduct 
workshops with NWS, decision-maker, media, and public participants to attempt to determine 
what kind of uncertainty information is usable and effective for all users. Using information from 
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studies along those lines could help create a uniform method of expressing uncertainty 
information. Creating a tool to help forecasters interpret model guidance and a uniform way to 
communicate uncertainty would eliminate a few of the many challenges forecasters face when 
forecasting extreme rainfall events.  
This study did have a few limitations. First, forecaster recollection of events may not 
have been perfect. Some forecasters were interviewed about events that had occurred four years 
prior. While forecasters did say that these events were significant enough that they remembered 
them in vivid detail, it should be noted that memories are not perfect. Another limitation of this 
study is that it was conducted in an area that sees significant rainfall events relatively frequently, 
especially in recent years. Because of these forecasters’ experience with these events, their 
responses would likely differ from forecasters in regions where such events do not happen that 
frequently or of that magnitude. Another limitation is the possible bias of the author when coding 
the interview responses. While deductive reasoning provided pre-established concepts to apply to 
the responses, coding can be subjective. The author made every effort to be as unbiased as 
possible, but adding another coder may have resulted in slight differences.  
Chapter Takeaways: 
- Although research has shown that including uncertainty information improves decisions 
made based on the forecast, forecasters did not feel that uncertainty should be provided to 
the public.  
- How forecasts are conveyed depends on the audience. More complicated information is 
given to sophisticated users and in line with previous research, forecasters emphasized 
the importance of relationships with these users.  
- Previous research has applied mental and conceptual models to the weather forecasting 
process and this project expanded on that by incorporating sensemaking, judgement and 
decision-making, and principles of forecasting into a simple process model. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This study investigated the forecast and communication processes used by NWS 
forecasters leading up to and during extreme rainfall events. This study asked and provided 
practical conclusions to the following questions: how do forecasters process model outliers? 
How do they communicate those outliers and outlying events? And, do they consider the impacts 
of climate change on these events? A high-level, theoretical understanding of these processes can 
be gained through the application of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005; Doswell 2004) and 
decision-making (Millet et al. 2020) frameworks and the principles of forecasting (Armstrong 
2001b) to the responses, which are depicted in the simple forecasting process model (Fig. 4.1).  
Forecasters will use the sensemaking frameworks of retrospect, presumption, 
representativeness, and organizing through communication and the decision-making frameworks 
of availability bias and affect, calling on their expertise and experience as they work to 
comprehend the evolving weather situation. This comprehension is also impacted by 
organizational guidelines, to which the social and systemic sensemaking concept and the 
anchoring and adjustment decision-making concept can be applied. When forecasters are 
processing model output, the sensemaking processes of action and organizing flux play a role. 
Forecasters must decide if the model output is valid or if it needs adjustment, and consistent 
model output signals to the forecasters that an extreme rainfall event is likely and their attention 
should be shifted in that direction. However, models are not always consistent, and forecasters 
stated that when they see a model outlier, they will likely keep an eye on it to see how it and 
other models evolve in subsequent model runs. That outlier may also be communicated as a 
possible worst-case scenario, especially to sophisticated users like Emergency Managers.  
Forecasters are constantly dealing with forecast uncertainty and how to convey that 
uncertainty to their audiences. The forecasters did not agree on how they should convey 
uncertainty. Suggestions included: qualitative confidence levels like “expected”, probabilities of 
exceedance, ranges, and probability of precipitation. There was also no consensus on what kind 
of uncertainty information that the forecasters felt the general public could understand. Some 
forecasters said that they need help from social scientists and educational campaigns to be able to 
convey uncertainty in a way that is understandable and useful to their audiences.  
When communicating these events to their partners, forecasters must consider the 
forecast presentation. They must ensure that their messaging is consistent and do this through the 
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sensemaking framework of organizing through communication. One clear, consistent message 
will reduce the chance that the audiences will experience the decision-making bias of 
confirmation bias, meaning that they stick to a worst (or best) case scenario rather than the most 
likely scenario. How the forecast is presented also depends on the variable being presented, and 
forecasters felt that extreme rainfall events are best communicated through impacts rather than 
numbers. By describing impacts, forecasters can help their audience better picture what an event 
could look like, which reduces the decision-making bias of availability bias.  
How the forecast is presented also depends on the audience to which the forecast is being 
presented. Forecasters thought that for the public, information should be kept relatively simple. 
With partners, they feel that they can provide slightly more complex information. For example, 
when briefing such partners, they can include various possible scenarios. Forecasters emphasized 
the importance of the relationships with these partners and building trust with them even when 
the weather is “quiet”. They will use the sensemaking process of organizing through 
communication to make sure that their partners are understanding the event properly. Interaction 
with the media varied from office to office. Some offices included the media on their briefings 
while others did not. It seemed that the main vehicle for interaction with the media was NWS 
Chat.  
The most important part of the forecast presentation is that it is understandable and 
usable. When creating these forecast products, forecasters will consider the sensemaking and 
decision-making processes that their users will go through. These processes include the 
sensemaking frameworks of retrospect, labeling, and presumption and the decision-making 
frameworks of availability bias, confirmation bias, gambler’s fallacy, affect, finite pool of worry, 
and loss aversion. By considering these frameworks, forecasters are better able to communicate 
effectively to their audiences.  
 Most forecasters stated that they are noticing an increase in extreme rainfall events, to 
which the noticing and bracketing component of the sensemaking framework can be applied. 
However, they do not link this increase to climate change when making forecasts. This can be 
explained by the sensemaking framework of social and systemic. Forecasters felt that thinking 
about climate change was something that is beyond their role as a meteorologist and something 
that should be left to climate scientists. However, some considered climate change as a factor 
after the event occurred.  
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 The data indicated that sensemaking and decision-making frameworks and the principles 
of forecasting help describe the forecast and communication process for extreme rainfall events 
(Fig. 4.1). It is important to note that only a small sample of forecasters was interviewed, so 
these results cannot be generalized across the NWS in the SCIPP region or nationally. The 
forecasting process is also a lot more complex than what the model depicts, and each forecaster 
has their own unique forecasting process. However, these results provide a high-level 
understanding of the process. This understanding can help add to the knowledge base of how 
forecasters turn their expertise into usable information. 
 These results open the door to several future research projects. It would be of interest to 
follow up with participants when another extreme rainfall event impacts their region and ask 
them if participating in this study led them to think more about how climate change could have 
played a role in that event. This study could be expanded outside of the SCIPP region or 
conducted in another region and results could be compared. Adding more participants to the 
study would also make the results more representative of NWS forecasters in the SCIPP region 
or the entire organization. Using these results to create an online survey would allow a larger 
pool of forecasters to be reached. Studies specific to how end-users (on all levels of 
sophistication) understand uncertainty information pertaining to extreme rainfall events could be 
conducted to find what these users prefer and understand can be compared. Workshops that 
include forecasters, decision-makers, media, and public users could be conducted to educate on 
how to convey and interpret uncertainty information and even develop products that benefit all 
audiences.  
 These results provide theoretical and practical understandings of forecast and 
communication processes prior to and during extreme rainfall events and could help guide future 
research. NWS forecasters want to improve communication so that their audiences can be better 
prepared to protect themselves in the face of a significant rainfall event and are open to working 
with social scientists to do that.  
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Note that not all questions were asked for each participant. The questions asked depended on the 
event, the WFO, and the forecaster.  
Demographic Information:  
1. How long have you worked at [WFO LOCATION]?  
a) (If participant has changed locations since the event) How long had you worked at 
[PREVIOUS WFO] at the time of the event?  
2. What is your job title?  
3. How long have you been a forecaster?  
4. Were you working during [EVENT]?  
a) If not, were you aware of and following the event?  
Event Questions:   
5. How accurate were the models leading up to the event?  
a) Were they consistent?  
b) Did that (in)consistency affect your messaging about the event?  
c) Which model do you feel performed the best?  
6. Had you ever forecasted an event of similar magnitude prior to this one?  
a) (If yes) how did this one compare?  
b) Did that experience shape your decision making during the event? If so, how?  
c) Alternatively: had you ever worked a rainfall event that was expected to be extreme, but 
was over-forecasted?   
7. How long before the event did you realize that it would be of such an extreme magnitude?  
8. (If applicable) Leading up to and during this event, there were historically high values of 
precipitable water. What do you think caused the atmosphere to be able to hold this much 
moisture?   
Communication:  
9. What type of uncertainty information do you think is appropriate for the public?  
a) Do you prefer providing ranges of possibilities or to describe them qualitatively?  
b) Does the way you express uncertainty vary between audiences? (Public vs. EM’s vs. 
Media, etc.) If so, how?  
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10. What was your interaction with Emergency Management before and during the event?  
a) Do you have any sense as to whether your message about high rainfall totals was 
received by them?  
11. Did you work with the media?   
a) Do you have any sense as to whether your message about high rainfall totals was 
received by them?  
12. At [TIME], your office published [PRODUCT] forecasting [RANGE] inches of rain. How 
confident were you that [MAX] would be the maximum amount?   
a) Was there another value that was in your mind as a possible maximum?  
b) If so, what factors led you (or your office) to go with [PUBLISHED MAX]?  
c) What additional evidence would you want in order to go with the higher maximum 
value?  
13. i) On [DATE/TIME] a forecast graphic was published [INSERT GRAPHIC] that provided 
ranges of potential precipitation amounts. This implies uncertainty. What factors led you (or 
your office) to communicate it this way rather than providing a deterministic forecast?   
-OR-  
ii) On [DATE/TIME] a forecast graphic was published [INSERT GRAPHIC] that provided a 
deterministic forecast precipitation amount. This implies certainty. What factors led you (or 
your office) to communicate it this way rather than providing a range of values?  
-OR-   
iii) On [DATE/TIME] a forecast graphic was published [INSERT GRAPHIC] provided both 
a range of forecasted precipitation amounts and deterministic values. What factors led you 
(or your office) to communicate it this way rather than choosing between the two?   
14. i) Before the event, the WPC was forecasting [Amount of rain]. What factors informed your 
(or your office’s) decision to forecast a lower amount of rain?  
-OR-  
ii) Before the event, the WPC was forecasting [Amount of rain]. What factors informed your 
(or your office’s) decision to forecast a higher amount of rain?   
-OR-  
iii) Before the event, the WPC was forecasting [Amount of rain].  What factors informed 
your (or your office’s) decision to issue a similar (or the same) forecast?  
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15. [IF APPLICABLE] One product issued stated that this event was “Historic” (or unique in 
some way) [INSERT PRODUCT]. What thoughts were going through your mind when that 
post went out?    
16. i) Your office started talking about the potential for a very heavy event early on. Describe the 
factors that contributed to your high confidence that this would be a significant event.   
-OR-  
ii)There was no discussion about the severity of this event until just before the event began. 
Describe the factors that kept you from forecasting that event ahead of time?  
17. (if applicable) On [DATE], this product [INSERT PRODUCT] forecasted [AMOUNT OF 
RAIN] falling in a [TIME PERIOD (i.e. twelve hours)] period within the event.  
a) What evidence led you to forecast such a high amount of rain in that amount of time?  
b) What did you want your audience to understand about a rainfall amount of that 
magnitude in such a short amount of time?   
18. How important is it to have social media as a communication tool during an event like this?  
a) Has your (or your office’s) use of social media evolved since this event?  
Post-Event  
19. After the event, when storm totals started coming in at record numbers, how did you react?  
20. Has this event changed how you or others in your office approach rainfall forecasts, extreme 
or otherwise?  
General Questions:  
21. When you see a model outlier predicting a large amount of rainfall, what is your thought 
process?  
a) If you decide to acknowledge said outlier- what do you look for as far as evidence to 
support that model? (Other Models, synoptic set-up, climatology, etc.)  
b) How confident do you have to be to account for the outlier in your forecast?   
22. What are the main points you want your audience to understand when communicating the 
potential for extreme rainfall? (Threat to life/property, magnitude, no precedence, etc.)  
23. Do you think the frequency of heavy precipitation events is increasing?  
a) (If they bring up climate change) Is climate change on your mind during the forecast 
process?    
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b) (If yes) When you are doing a forecast, how often does climate change affect your 
decisions? (Always, Sometimes, Never, etc.)  
24. Is there anything else that you think is important to bring up regarding forecasting extreme 
rainfall, in terms of how you interpret outliers or communicate outliers.   
  
 
 
 
